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Abstract 
 
Dunning’s Eclectic Paradigm is used to assess the effectiveness and impact of U.S. drug 
prohibition policy on economic growth and political stability in Latin American countries 
as well as the decision making of Latin American Transnational Criminal Enterprises 
(TCE) in the cocaine-coca market.  Results showed U.S. drug prohibition policy reduces 
the on-site supply but does not significantly reduce the transportation of cocaine and coca. 
U.S. drug prohibition policy also generated political instability for the region, and revealed 
policy externalities that facilitated TCE expansion. Tougher U.S. drug prohibition policy 
advances TCE by amplifying the impact that unemployment and local wages have on 
increases in cocaine-coca production, and by limiting the impact of control of corruption 
and economic freedom on coca eradication.  Our results signal that a site-specific approach 
accompanied with policies that improve the farmers’ economic freedom, such as land 
formalization rights, and policies that lower unemployment rate facilitate effective U.S. 
drug prohibition policy.   
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1. Introduction  
 
The Americas are the world’s main supplier of cocaine-coca as measured in terms of 
cultivation, manufacturing, eradication, and seizures.  Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru account 
for virtually all of the world’s coca bush cultivation and cocaine manufacturing 
(Organization of American States (OAS), 2013d).  Colombia, the world’s top 
manufacturer, accounts for 42 percent of the world’s cocaine output,1 64 percent of the 
world’s land under coca bush cultivation,2 and 52 percent of the world’s land subject to 
coca bush eradication (United National Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 2017b).3  
The majority of drug transportation occurs in and around Latin American countries. In 
2016, the United States Department of State estimated that the Mexico-Central America 
corridor accounted for 90 percent of the cocaine trafficked into the U.S. (Bureau for 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 2017).   
 
United States drug prohibition policy spending uses a three-fold approach: (1) domestic 
law enforcement, (2) reduction of transportation of illicit drugs and, (3) international efforts 
to reduce illicit drug supply (Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), 2014).  
This paper assesses the effectiveness and impact of U.S. drug prohibition policy 
approaches in reducing the transportation of cocaine-coca, along with the reduction of 
existing supplies of on-site cocaine production and the eradication of coca fields (currently 
or potentially used for production), using Dunning’s Eclectic Paradigm, when dealing with 
Central, North, and South America. The U.S. drug prohibition approach depends on the 
geographic positioning of distribution outlets and production-sites associated with the 
cocaine market with the belief that increases in policy spending restricting supply have an 
indirect relationship with cocaine’s availability. 
 
International business literature has addressed locational decisions of multinational 
enterprises  by applying Dunning’s Eclectic Paradigm (Dunning, 1977, 1988a, 1996, 2009; 
Dunning and McKaig-Berliner, 2002).  Dunning’s paradigm identifies the Ownership, 
Location, and Internalization characteristics that influence multinational enterprises 
decisions.  Ownership, Location, and Internalization  characteristics are drawn from 
macroeconomic theories of trade, international capital movements and location, and 
microeconomic theories of industrial organization, innovation, and firm site-selection 
(Tolentino, 2001).   
 
This paper extends the existing literature by applying Dunning’s Eclectic Paradigm to 
Transnational Criminal Enterprises.  Enderwick (2009, 2016) and Mudambi and Paul 
(2003), all used Dunning’s Eclectic Paradigm (from a theoretical perspective) to explain 
                                                          
1 Estimates of cocaine manufacturing is based on the area under cultivation, coca yield estimates, and cocaine 
lab efficiency. In 2015, the total potential manufacturing of 100 percent pure cocaine for the world was 995 
metric tons and Colombia’s production was 420 metric tons (Office of National Drug Control Policy 
(ONDCP), 2016). 
2 The coca bush cultivation (hectares) reported for 2015 were: Colombia 159,000, Bolivia 36,500 and Peru 
53,000 (Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), 2016). 
3 Eradication of coca bush (hectares) for 2015 were: Colombia 50,672, Peru 35,868, and Bolivia 11,020 
(United National Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 2017b). 
Review of Economic Analysis forthcoming, 2020 (12)
3 
 
 
the locational choices of Transnational Criminal Enterprises.  We will take this approach 
one step further by empirically testing Dunning’s Paradigm on illegal drug traffickers’ 
locational behavior in the Americas.4 When Ownership, Location, and Internalization 
characteristics are used in conjunction with U.S. drug prohibition policy it allows the 
observation of governmental efforts to regulate, destroy or inadvertently promote cocaine 
markets. Specifically, we investigate U.S drug prohibition policy’s effectiveness at 
reducing cocaine-coca supply, its unintended effects at advancing Transnational Criminal 
Enterprises, and the impact of U.S. drug prohibition policy on the Latin American 
economy. Additionally, we will investigate whether Ownership, Location, or 
Internalization advantages exist to Transnational Criminal Enterprises, and if they result 
in strengthening or limiting effective U.S. drug prohibition policy.  By identifying 
Transnational Criminal Enterprises’ Ownership, Location, or Internalization 
characteristics, a national or local government could tailor a more effective drug 
prohibition policy.  
 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review on U.S. drug 
prohibition policies. Section 3 discusses Dunning’s Eclectic Paradigm as a framework to 
analyze the effectiveness of U.S. drug prohibition policy at reducing cocaine-coca supply, 
and its impact in Latin America.  Section 4 and Section 5 discuss the variables used in the 
estimation and data sources, respectively.  Section 6 outlines the empirical methodology 
which includes a discussion of missingness in the data. Section 7 provides a discussion of 
results. The final section presents our conclusions and policy implications. 
 
 
2. U.S. Drug Policies 
 
The United States has been involved in international drug control and has made efforts 
to decrease drug supplies since the beginning of the 20th century (Rosen, 2015).  United 
States drug prohibition started in 1914 when Congress passed the Harrison Act which 
banned opiates and cocaine (Redford and Powell, 2016).  Alcohol prohibition quickly 
followed, and by 1918, with the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment, the U.S. was 
officially a "dry" nation.   
 
With the Narcotics Drugs Import and Export Act of 1922, U.S. drug prohibition policy 
began to focus on combating the emergence of illegal criminal markets by controlling the 
flow of narcotics.  In 1930, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics was created. Soon after the 
creation of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, possession and transfer of marijuana was made 
unlawful under the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 (Bonnie and Whitebread, 1970).5 In 1951, 
the Boggs Act was passed which increased drug related penalties and introduced 
mandatory minimum sentences for the possession and sale of narcotics (Gill, 2008).  In 
1956, the Narcotics Control Act increased the minimum sentences of crimes specified in 
the Boggs Act.  In 1970, the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) was enacted into law by 
Congress and has become the foundation for “the modern drug war” that U.S. drug policy 
                                                          
4 No prior research has empirically tested Dunning’s Eclectic Paradigm in association with Transnational 
Criminal Enterprises.   
5 In 1933, the Twenty-First Amendment repealed the Eighteenth Amendment revoking alcohol prohibition.   
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is fighting.  In 1973, the newly formed Drug Enforcement Administration took over the 
enforcement of the CSA  (United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), 2020).  
The CSA was amended with the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 and 1988, which made the 
system more punitive to illicit drug offenders (Courtwright, 2004).6 
 
United States drug control budgets have been mostly allocated to supply reduction 
efforts which include domestic law enforcement, international drug control efforts, and 
interdiction/disruption of illicit drug shipments.  The estimates for the data used in this 
paper indicates that between 1995 and 2015, an average of about 70 percent of the U.S. 
drug control budget had been allocated to supply reduction efforts. However, according to 
Reuter and Kleiman (1986), U.S. illicit drug consumption is unresponsive to illicit drug 
supply prohibition efforts. Supply prohibition efforts have been found inefficient at raising 
the retail price of cocaine, which is a short-term indicator of the efficacy of supply 
reduction enforcement efforts to reduce illicit drug consumption (Caulkins and Reuter, 
2010; Reuter and Kleiman, 1986).  
 
Some early evidence indicates U.S. drug prohibition policy’s inefficacy at reducing 
domestic cocaine supply and increasing U.S. cocaine retail prices.  In terms of domestic 
law enforcement, between 1979 and 1989 the number of arrests for cocaine distribution 
increased (Reuter, 1991).  The increase in domestic arrests did not offset the supply 
increases, given the fact that prices fell between 1979 and 1989.7  The increase in domestic 
arrests also reduced the effectiveness of law enforcement efforts by diversifying the 
sources of supply (Reuter, 1991).   
 
In terms of international drug control efforts, reduction of illicit drugs at the source-
country has also shown to be ineffective at raising the U.S. cocaine retail prices and 
reducing domestic supply (Caulkins and Reuter, 2010).  Several reasons appear to indicate 
the ineffectiveness of U.S. drug prohibition policy at the source-country level: 1) 
production costs, 2) market concentration, 3) limitations on the application of U.S. policy 
overseas, and 4) responses of suppliers to U.S. drug prohibition policy.  The cost of 
production at early stages of the production process (i.e. cultivating and refining) is a small 
percentage of the cocaine’s retail price, which is estimated to be less than one percent of 
the U.S. retail price for cocaine (Caulkins and Reuter, 2010) . Low market concentration 
(i.e. large number of market participants: large number of refining labs and farmers) at 
early stages of the cocaine production process also provides difficulties for the U.S. to 
reduce supply at the source-country (Caulkins and Reuter, 2010).  A third reason is the 
limitation of applying U.S. drug prohibition policy overseas.  Application of U.S. drug 
prohibition policy internationally is limited by the interests and capabilities of the source-
country (Moore, 1990). Additionally, Moore (1990) indicates that in the past, U.S. 
prohibition policies have focused on crop control strategies such as eradication and crop 
substitution programs, but the prevalence of potential cultivating areas makes eradication 
policies a difficult task. Lastly, suppliers respond to U.S. drug prohibition policy by 
changing cultivation patterns. Roberts, Trace, and Klein (2004), assert that successful 
reduction in coca cultivation in Bolivia and Peru, resulted in increased coca cultivation in 
Colombia.   
                                                          
6 In 2010, many states started the process of legalizing or decriminalizing marijuana.  
7 The average price of cocaine in 1989 was 50 percent lower than in 1979.   
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Similarly, U.S. drug interdiction policy has also been criticized for their successes in 
reducing supply and raising U.S. cocaine retail prices. Scholarly literature suggests that 
U.S. drug interdiction policy has not been effective because of: 1) smuggling costs, 2) 
substitution of smuggling routes, and 3) a focus on interdiction policy at finished 
inventories.  Reuter (1992) reports that smuggling costs account for less than 10 percent of 
the U.S. cocaine retail prices, which means the size of the seizure must be large enough to 
affect the entrepreneur’s assets, limiting the interdiction policy’s financial impact on the 
narcotic traffickers (Caulkins and Reuter, 2010). Smuggling routes are also substituted in 
response to interdiction enforcement. Andreas (2000) suggests that U.S. drug interdiction 
efforts redirected air and sea smuggling routes to ground routes through Mexico.8 
Additionally, Moore (1990) indicates that entrepreneurs also hedge against the risk of 
losing total shipments by dividing it into smaller shipments. Finally, Moore (1990) claims 
that interdiction policy is focused on finished inventories instead of disrupting trafficking 
networks. 
 
In addition, Reuter and Kleiman (1986) point out that supply prohibition efforts cannot 
decrease consumption because they do not change consumer preferences.  The solo 
approach of illicit drug supply reduction in Latin American countries in conjunction with 
the external erosions of their institutions has failed (Rosen, 2015; Youngers, 2013; 
Youngers and Rosin, 2005). U.S. drug policy’s collateral damages is forcing changes in 
policy from simply concentrating on current drug control policy failures to crafting 
alternative approaches (Youngers, 2013), such as liberalizing the aspects of control polices 
from the demand side (Organization of American States (OAS), 2013c).9 
 
   
3. Dunning’s Eclectic Paradigm  
 
Dunning’s Eclectic Paradigm identifies the advantages international businesses receive 
from Ownership, Location, or Internalization characteristics. Ownership variables are 
firm-specific advantages derived from resource control or firm ownership (McCann and 
Mudambi, 2004).  Rugman and Gestrin (1993) describe Ownership advantages as the 
firm’s competitive-production or marketing-based assets.  Location advantages are derived 
from region-specific advantages, including resource access, factor endowments, networks, 
and institutions (McCann and Mudambi, 2004; Rugman and Gestrin, 1993).  Location 
advantages are immobile endowments firms have to use conjointly with their Ownership 
advantages  (Dunning, 2000, 2001).  Internalization advantages result from reducing 
transactional costs by internalizing transactions formerly carried out in the market 
(Buckley, 1993), as well as, the firm’s ability to appropriate returns on its asset ownership 
and synchronize cross border activities  (Cantwell and Narula, 2001).   
 
Previous applications of Dunning’s Eclectic Paradigm have been widely applied to 
legal operating enterprises (Dunning, 1996; Dunning and McKaig-Berliner, 2002).  
However, the relevance of Dunning’s Eclectic Paradigm to Transnational Criminal 
                                                          
8 The South Florida Task Force, launched in 1982, targeted air and smuggling routes in the Southeast 
(Andreas, 2000). 
9 For example, in the U.S., decriminalization of marijuana for personal use in some states. 
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Enterprises emanates from its similarities to multinational (legal) enterprises (Enderwick, 
2009).  Both multinational enterprises and Transnational Criminal Enterprises emphasize 
profits as their principal business objective and are resource mechanisms that respond to 
market and institutional failures.  They both also attempt external growth strategies, and 
establish worldwide facilities for production, marketing, and distribution.  Their production 
contributes to economic output and growth, and both have international supporting 
services.10 They also respond to changing global business environments accruing benefits 
from new distribution markets, increasing international income inequalities, and  advanced 
communication and transportation technology (Enderwick, 2009). 
 
Dunning’s Eclectic Paradigm is used as our framework for investigating the connection 
between U.S. drug prohibition policy and Transnational Criminal Enterprises locational 
behavior in Latin America in relation to the cocaine-coca market.  Specifically, we will 
empirically determine how Ownership, Location, and Internalization variables motivate 
Transnational Criminal Enterprises locational decisions in Latin America, assess the 
effectiveness of U.S. drug prohibition policy along with its relationship to the Ownership, 
Location, and Internalization variables.  Moreover, we will evaluate the economic and 
political impact of U.S. drug prohibition policy in Latin America.  
 
Applying Dunning’s Eclectic Paradigm to a country is inconsistent with previous uses. 
However, given the illegality of Transnational Criminal Enterprises, the advantages for 
illegal enterprises stem from a country’s characteristics and its competitive advantages. In 
the Transnational Criminal Enterprise framework Ownership advantages result from a 
country’s “history of narcotics cultivation, weak law enforcement” and “stem from 
strategies of risk reduction including operating from a low risk home base” (Enderwick, 
2016). In the case of Location advantages, Transnational Criminal Enterprises take 
advantage of the favorable conditions in host countries. As Transnational Criminal 
Enterprises move operations to other countries, the location advantage relies on the new 
home-country advantages. For example, “legality” of the illicit drugs under domestic law 
can be easily exploited by Transnational Criminal Enterprises. In countries like Bolivia, 
the legal production of coca under domestic law has permitted the growth and relocation 
of organized drug traffickers (Enderwick, 2016). In this way, Location advantages to 
Transnational Criminal Enterprises stem from the new home-country opportunities. 
Internalization advantages for Transnational Criminal Enterprises come from the country’s 
market failures, the benefit of maintaining secrecy, the lack of market prices for 
intermediate goods and services, and the lack of legal forms of compliance (Enderwick, 
2016).  
 
Other economic theory points to industry advantages stemming from a home-country 
competitive advantage. Porter (1990) asserts that a nation’s competitive advantage is tied 
directly to industry advantages, since nations play an important role on how industries 
operate. Porter’s diamond of national competitive advantage explains how nations provide 
a “favorable home base for companies to operate internationally” (Porter, 1990).  In this 
                                                          
10 Transnational Criminal Enterprises are more likely to pursue alliances instead of mergers or acquisitions, 
and they employ contract killers and money launders.   
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context, Dunning’s Eclectic Paradigm can also translate into home country’s 
characteristics that facilitate nations to be successful in particular industries.11   
 
The evaluation of U.S. drug prohibition policy in Dunning’s Eclectic Paradigm 
framework for Transnational Criminal Enterprises is done by estimating two main models.  
In the first model, illicit drug supply of cocaine-coca12 is estimated through direct 
(cultivation, potential production, and eradication13) and indirect indicators (transport 
seizures).  Model 1 (equation 1 below) is used to empirically determine how Ownership, 
Location, and Internalization variables motivate Transnational Criminal Enterprises 
locational decisions in the Americas. In addition, Model 1 is used to assess the 
effectiveness of the U.S. drug prohibition policy and its relationship to the Ownership, 
Location, and Internalization variables. Specifically, for Model 1, each thi  illicit drug 
supply indicator ( 1i  for seizures, 2i  for cultivation, 3i   for potential cocaine 
production, and 4i  for eradication) in the  
th
j  country at time t  is defined as, 
 
   
  
 
0 1 t
2 t 3
4 5
Log log
log
log ,
 
 
  
 
  
  
 ljt
ijt
ljt l
l
t j ijt
Supply Indicator Prohibition
Prohibition x x
U.S.Cocaine Price Big Country
  (1) 
where tProhibition  measures U.S. drug prohibition policy, ljt
x represents the thl   
Ownership, Location, or Internalization variable, tU.S.Cocaine Price  is the U.S. cocaine 
                                                          
11 Porter (1990)’s theory of a country’s competitive advantage defines four different attributes for a nation 
that explains how industries, and therefore firms, are established and operated. The first attribute defined in 
Potter’s theory is the nation’s “factor conditions” referring to the nation’s factors of production relevant to 
countries to compete in an industry. The second attribute, “demand conditions,” refers to home market 
demand conditions that force companies to innovate and become more competitive. The third attribute, 
“related and supporting industries,” refers to the presence of supporting and related industries (and that are 
internationally competitive) in the home country which facilitates mutually beneficial interactions to 
innovate. Last, the “firm strategy, structure, and rivalry” attribute, is defined as the country’s atmosphere 
affecting how firms are established and operated.  Dunning’s Ownership, Location, and Internalization 
advantages can’t exactly translate one-to-one to match Porter’s theory attributes, but can be framed within 
Porter’s theory. Dunning’s Ownership advantages resemble the “factor conditions” attribute in Porter’s 
theory. Dunning’s Location advantages can be associated to Porter’s “related and supporting industries” 
attribute. Related and supporting industries in the home country that are internationally competitive are 
affected by the host country characteristics. Host country characteristics affect home-country related and 
supporting industries interaction with other home-country firms and their business strategies. Dunning’s 
Internalization advantages can be associated to the “firm strategy, structure, and rivalry” attribute, as market 
failures driving internalization are circumstances affecting how industries operate.  
12 Figures on cultivation, production, eradication, and seizures depict the dominant role of the Americas in 
the illicit drug market.  Ninety  percent of the world’s cocaine seizures were reported in the Americas, with 
production being concentrated in Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia (United National Office of Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC), 2010a, 2010b). 
13 The degree of eradication also reflects the extent by which authorities prioritize coca cultivation eradication 
(United National Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 2017c) 
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retail price index, jBig Country is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the country 
th
j is a main producer of cocaine-coca and zero otherwise. The unobserved disturbances 
for each observation in equation (1) are represented by ijt .  The interaction of the U.S. 
drug prohibition policy with each of the Ownership, Location, and Internalization variables 
(i.e.  log t ljtProhibition x ), allows us to identify how Ownership, Location or 
Internalization variables strengthen or limit U.S. drug prohibition policy.  In addition, the 
interaction terms allow us to assess U.S. drug prohibition policy’s unintended effect at 
advancing Transnational Criminal Enterprises.   
 
The second model (equations 2 and 3 below) evaluates the economic and political 
impact of U.S. drug prohibition policy in Latin America. Equations 2 and 3 estimate the 
impact of U.S. drug prohibition policy on real GDP growth and political stability, after 
controlling for the impacts of the Ownership, Location, and Internalization variables that 
determine Transnational Criminal Enterprises locational decisions. The simultaneous 
regression of real GDP growth and political stability is defined as, 
 
 
 
0 1 2
3 4 1
log
log
  
  
  
  
 ljtjt t l
l
t j jt
Real GDP Growth Prohibition x
U.S.Cocaine Price Big Country
         (2) 
 
 
 
0 1 2
3 4 2
log
log ,
  
  
  
  
 ljtjt t l
l
t j jt
Political Stability Prohibition x
U.S.Cocaine Price Big Country
        (3)  
where 1 jt  and 2 jt   are the unobserved disturbances for the real GDP growth and political 
stability equations, respectively.  The simultaneous regression of real GDP growth and 
political stability allows us to consider the correlation among real GDP growth and political 
stability. 
 
4. Definition of Variables  
 
Table 1 describes and lists the illicit drug supply and impact indicators.  Cocaine-coca 
seizures from both Latin America and the U.S. are used to signal regional drug availability.  
Cocaine-coca market production is measured using coca cultivation and potential cocaine 
production.14  On-site seizures are measured using coca eradication.  Real GDP growth and 
political stability are the impact indicators measuring U.S. drug prohibition policy impacts 
in Latin America.  
 
 
                                                          
14 Potential cocaine production is defined as the amount of cocaine that would be produced yearly if all the 
area under coca cultivation was converted into 100 percent pure cocaine hydrochloride (United National 
Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 2010b).   
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics - independent variables 
Dependent Variables No. Obs. Description Mean Std. dev. 
Illicit Drug Supply Indicators 
Cocaine-Coca   
Seizures 
359 
Total drug seizure of cocaine-
coca (kilograms) 
137,946 371,350 
Coca Cultivation 60 
Net coca cultivation for main 
coca producers (i.e. Colombia, 
Bolivia, and Peru) (hectares) 
63,614 44,381 
Potential Cocaine    
Production 
60 
Potential pure cocaine production 
for main coca producers (i.e. 
Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru) 
(metric tons) 
252 134 
Coca Eradication 60 
Coca bush eradication for main 
coca producers (Colombia, 
Bolivia, and Peru) (hectares). 
46,524 62,408 
Impact Indicators   
Real GDP Growth 360 
Growth of real GDP given in 
constant 2011 U.S.D (%) 
3.5 3.35 
Political Stability a 306 
Political Stability and absence of 
violence/terrorism (index;     
range -2.5 and 2.5) 
-0.3 0.67 
a Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism measures perceptions of the likelihood of political 
instability and/or politically-motivated violence, including terrorism (The World Bank, 2017b).  Higher 
values of the index represent countries with greater political stability. 
 
 
U.S. drug prohibition policy, focusing on transport seizures and international illicit 
drug control expenditures, along with the Ownership, Location, and Internalization 
variables are described in Table 2.  Transport seizures are measured using interdiction 
expenditures directed at disrupting drug distribution profits by the interruption of illicit 
drug transportation into the U.S. (Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), 2013).  
International illicit drug control spending includes the eradication of crops, prosecution of 
traffickers, elimination of processing capabilities, promotion of alternative crops, and the 
investigation of money laundering or financial crime activities (Office of National Drug 
Control Policy (ONDCP), 2013).  Prohibition is expected to negatively impact 
Transnational Criminal Enterprises by reducing the supply of illicit drugs.  Mejia and 
Restrepo (2014) report a significant reduction, approximately 200 to 500 metric tons, in 
Colombia’s net cocaine supply as result of successful interdiction policies in 2007.  In 
addition, prohibition can cause input prices to increase. The United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reported that Peru’s coca eradication efforts in 2013 caused 
the average price of dried coca leaf to increase by 30 percent (United National Office of 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 2015).  Unfortunately, prohibition also positively impacts 
Translational Criminal Enterprises by increasing illicit drug retail prices.15   
 
 
 
                                                          
15 For example, wholesale prices for cannabis users in the western U.S. went from $3,500 dollars per pound 
with prohibition to an estimated $2,000 dollars per pound with partial illicit drug prohibition (Caulkins, 
2014). 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics – dependent variables 
Explanatory 
Variables 
No. 
Obs. 
Description Mean Std. Dev. 
Prohibition Variables     
U.S. Interdiction 
Expenditure 
20 
U.S. expenditure on interdiction illicit 
drug control (millions of constant 
2011 U.S.D) 
2,887 645 
U.S.  International 
Expenditure 
20 
U.S. expenditure on international 
illicit drug control (millions of 
constant 2011 U.S.D) 
1,474 571 
Ownership Variables     
Control-of- 
Corruption Index 
306 
Index; range -2.5 (more corruption) 
and 2.5 (less corruption) 
-0.19 0.79 
Location Variables     
Unemployment 
Rate 
360 
Unemployment, total (% of total 
labor force) 
7.6 3.69 
Relative Minimum 
Wage 
338 
Country’s monthly relative minimum 
wage (local minimum wage in 
constant 2011 U.S.D as a percentage 
of U.S. minimum wage in constant 
2011 U.S.D; %) 
25.57 21.68 
Human Capital 
Index 
360 
Human capital index based on years 
of schooling and returns to education 
(Index) 
2.46 0.44 
Openness 359 Trade (% of GDP) 62.87 31.12 
Distance 360 
Distance from US centroid to 
country’s centroid (in miles) 
3,185 1,489 
Internalization 
variables 
  
  
Economic Freedom 360 
Index of Economic Freedom (Index; 
range 0 (repressed) to 100 (free)) 
63.06 8.74 
Tariff Rate 334 
Tariff rate, applied, weighted mean, 
all products (%) 
6.39 3.58 
Internet Access 
360 Individuals using the internet (% of 
population) 
20.96 20.35 
Instrumental Variable 
  
  
IV 
 
Political Administration (Republican 
party=1; 0 otherwise) 
0.4 0.49 
Demand Proxy     
U.S. Cocaine Price 20 
Average U.S. Cocaine retail price 
index adjusted for purity (base year 
2011) 
83 26 
 
 
Transnational Criminal Enterprises often use prohibition as an Ownership, Location, 
and Internalization advantage. Prohibition as an Ownership advantage is associated with 
the effect of regulation on how Transnational Criminal Enterprises manage their business 
operations. As firms become more globalized, the ownership advantage relies more on their 
ability to manage and coordinate a network of geographical activities  (Dunning, 1988b). 
Government regulation (or prohibition) affects Transnational Criminal Enterprises by 
lowering the marginal cost and raising the marginal benefits to violence because their 
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transactions cannot use the legal and judicial system (Miron and Zwiebel, 1995). 
Governments that fail to enforce property rights in an illegal market, decrease costs of 
illegal methods of enforcement, leading to more private and less public enforcement 
(Mudambi and Paul, 2003). 
 
Prohibition as a Location advantage is associated with institutional failures.  Wealth 
transfers from the Transnational Criminal Enterprise to policy makers are indicative of 
political rent-seeking behavior, oftentimes result from institutional failures and policies.  
This behavior is associated with governmental regulation which forces changes to the 
enterprise’s operations (Butler and Castelo, 1998).   Other forms of regulation such as 
domestic market prohibitions, incentivize Transnational Criminal Enterprises to locate in 
jurisdictions with lower levels of state policing and political risks (Mudambi and Paul, 
2003).  Successful prohibition also drives Transnational Criminal Enterprises to different 
locations to substitute transit routes and relocate production sites (Enderwick, 2016).  
 
Prohibition as an Internalization advantage is associated with the effects of regulation 
on prices. Governmental regulation dealing with market failures oftentimes distorts prices 
which incentivizes the internalization of Transnational Criminal Enterprises’ activities 
(Mudambi and Paul, 2003).  Prohibition also incentivizes Transnational Criminal 
Enterprises to internalize their functions in order to reduce the risk of apprehension and 
punishment, such as with Peruvian coca traffickers, whom increased their profits by 
internalizing their cocaine production processes because of prohibition (Mudambi and 
Paul, 2003). Strong governmental regulation makes it difficult to find market prices for 
intermediate goods and services, encouraging Internalization advantages (Enderwick, 
2009; Mudambi and Paul, 2003).  Internalization is also an advantage when secrecy is 
critical, especially when strong regulation rescinds government supported claims to the 
illegal good and related property (Mudambi and Paul, 2003).  
 
Prohibition is expected to have a negative impact on economic growth. Public 
institutions face increased costs when dealing with health concerns caused by drug use, 
increased drug violence, and corruption.  Large amounts of public resources must also be 
allocated for any drug prohibition policy to work. Moreover, concentrating governmental 
resources into a small portion of the economy robs other economic sectors of potential 
governmentally sponsored economic development.16  In Brazil, between 2007 and 2012, 
the population of people incarcerated for drug trafficking increased by 123 percent 
(Organization of American States (OAS), 2013a).  In the U.S. the 2007 economic cost of 
illicit drug use, lost productivity, and crime was estimated at $193 billion dollars (National 
Drug Intelligence Center, 2011).   
 
Prohibition is also expected to have a negative impact on political stability. Similarly 
to the U.S. alcohol prohibition of the 1920s, drug prohibition moves transactions into the 
shadow economy where criminal enterprises can profit and undermine a country’s 
institutions. Rosen (2015) asserts that illicit financial flows (e.g. money laundering) 
associated with drug trafficking have penetrated legitimate economic institutions while 
undermining legitimate social and political systems.  Furthermore, the illicit drug industry 
                                                          
16 In Mexico, the government expenditure to combat drug trafficking in relation to GDP, is three times larger 
than the amount spent by the U.S. (Organization of American States (OAS), 2013a).   
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oftentimes serves as a conduit for wealth increases by politicians and persons in power as 
institutional corruption creates a lack of transparency and accountability (Organization of 
American States (OAS), 2013a).17  Political instability also occurs when a lack of legal job 
opportunities and excessive prohibition spending takes away potential funds needed for a 
country’s growth and development (Thornton, 1991).  
 
Ownership advantages for Transnational Criminal Enterprises are reduced or negated 
by the enterprises’ illegal status along with the associated risk of property seizures 
(Enderwick, 2009). Ownership advantages also improve the illegal enterprise’s ability to 
operate effectively by lowering risk and reducing the likelihood of detection (Enderwick, 
2009).  The Ownership variable is captured by the control-of-corruption index (see Table 
2). The control-of-corruption index measures the scope by which public power is used for 
private gain (The World Bank, 2017b).  The effect of the control-of-corruption index on 
Transnational Criminal Enterprises locational decision is ambiguous.  In countries with 
high levels of corruption (i.e. low values for the control-of-corruption index), 
Transnational Criminal Enterprises become influential of a country’s regulatory practices 
and legislation, reduce risk of interdiction, and facilitate drug trafficking (Berlusconi et 
al., 2017; Giommoni et al., 2017).  Mudambi and Paul (2003) assert that Ownership 
advantages result from Transnational Criminal Enterprises controlling resources 
providing means to coerce others, making the control of resources rather than the direct 
ownership, the principal source of their advantage.  However, weak governments make 
corruption levels disadvantageous to Transnational Criminal Enterprises by increasing the 
cost of doing business (e.g. increases in the value of bribes) (Mudambi and Paul, 2003).  
Thus, greater values for the control-of-corruption index is advantageous to Transnational 
Criminal Enterprises by lowering the cost of doing business, but it is disadvantageous by 
increasing risks in the transportation and production of illegal drugs.  Greater control of 
corruption is also expected to spur economic growth and generate political stability.  Latin 
American countries spend at least 10 percent of their GDP dealing with corruption (United 
National Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 2008) and the control of corruption 
indicates a level of governmental effectiveness and rule of law.18    
 
Transnational Criminal Enterprises can gain access to a country’s illegal drug supply 
and demand by exploiting Location advantages (Enderwick, 2009), such as 
unemployment rate, relative minimum wage, human capital, openness, and distance (see 
Table 2).  The local unemployment rate and the human capital index are considered local 
endowments, while local wages are considered an input cost advantage (McCann and 
Mudambi, 2004; Rugman and Gestrin, 1993).  The Location variable, unemployment rate, 
is expected to give locational advantages to Transnational Criminal Enterprises, as higher 
unemployment rates facilitate the growth of organized crime (Sung, 2004).  Increased 
unemployment significantly increases expected illegal earnings (Uggen and Thompson, 
2003) and many unemployed urban youths are recruited by gangs (Howell and Decker, 
1999; Spergel, 1991).  Higher unemployment rates are expected to be detrimental for 
                                                          
17 In 2009, the director of the national police in Guatemala and others under his command were fired after 
large amounts of confiscated cocaine went missing (United National Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 
2010a). 
18 In this research, the correlation between the control-of-corruption index, government effectiveness, and 
rule of law is 0.9. 
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economic growth and political stability. The second Location variable, relative minimum 
wage, is the ratio of the minimum wage between Latin American countries and the U.S.  
Low wages are advantageous to Transnational Criminal Enterprises because they lead to 
a greater likelihood of corruption (Cadot, 1987).  Uggen and Thompson (2003) found that 
during the 1970s, a recessionary period in the U.S., as legal earnings decreased expected 
illegal earnings increased. Lower local wages decrease the opportunity costs of legal 
employment and in some population cohorts generate higher crime rates (Gould et al., 
2002).  Low wages can also be a disadvantage to Transnational Criminal Enterprises when 
affecting worker’s productivity.  Greater performance related payments can spur 
productivity and increase output (Booth and Frank, 1999).  Higher minimum wages can 
also be limiting to economic growth and might increase political instability if higher 
wages increase unemployment  (Gould et al., 2002; Siebert, 1997).   The third Location 
variable, the human capital index, measures the country’s average years of schooling and 
educational rate of return  (Feenstra et al., 2013).  Reduced human capital levels give 
locational advantages to Transnational Criminal Enterprises because low skill levels 
imply a low opportunity cost of committing crime (Lochner, 2004).  Lochner (2004) also 
finds a significant effect of education on property and violent crimes for low skill workers.  
Human capital increases are expected to positively affect economic growth and political 
stability.19 The Location variable, openness, captures the advantages that globalization 
gives to Translational Criminal Enterprises. Globalization can increase income inequality 
allowing Translational Criminal Enterprises to target marginalized segments of the 
population (Enderwick, 2009).  For example, countries suffering increasing inequalities 
may offer Transnational Criminal Enterprises a marginalized labor force attracted to 
illegal activities.  Greater openness has also been found to increase economic growth 
(Singh, 2010), but its effect on political stability is ambiguous. The effect of openness on 
political stability depends on the country’s trading arrangements and trade policy (Kim, 
1996; Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2000).  The last Location variable, distance, is measured 
as the distance from the U.S. centroid to each country’s centroid.  The variable distance is 
included to capture geographical proximity to the U.S. market.  Geography creates a 
Location advantage when drug flows increase from lower to higher income countries 
(Enderwick, 2009) affecting the countries’ political stability.20  “Transnational Criminal 
Enterprises contribute to political, economic and social instability through corruption 
payments” (Enderwick, 2016), and political instability has been found to reduce economic 
growth (Alesina et al., 1996). 
 
The Internalization variables include economic freedom, tariff rate, and internet access 
(see Table 2).  Economic freedom measures a country’s average score for its ratings for 
rule of law (i.e. property rights and judicial effectiveness), government size, regulatory 
efficiency (i.e. business freedom, labor freedom, and monetary freedom), and open 
markets  (The Heritage Foundation, 2018).  We expect lower economic freedom to 
                                                          
19 The net effect of increased human capital levels could be detrimental to economic growth if a brain drain 
of higher educated individuals occurs. 
20 The distance variable is highly correlated with other variables used in the estimation. Therefore, it was 
only included in equations (2) and (3).  These equations measure the impact of the U.S. drug prohibition 
policy in Latin America.  The closer in distance to the U.S., the more likely a country experiences political 
instability, because of the illicit drug flow to the U.S. 
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encourage the development of the shadow economy and other illicit activities, which 
promotes Transnational Criminal Enterprises. Enste (2010) discovered that labor and 
product market regulations, for twenty-five OECD countries, were the primary causes for 
the development of shadow economies. Lack of property rights also increase the size of 
illicit economies. Muñoz-Mora et al. (2018) found that decreases in a land formalization 
index (i.e. worse property rights) significantly increases land area allocation to coca crops. 
Tariff rates21, are measured by the country’s weighted tariff rate for all products and 
capture the effect that market liberalization have on Transnational Criminal Enterprises. 
Transnational Criminal Enterprises are affected by market liberalization as more trade 
facilitates the laundering of illicit drug proceeds through Trade Based Money Laundering 
(Financial Action Task Force (FATF), 2006).  Internet access is measured as the 
percentage of individuals in the total population who have used the internet in the past 
three months.   Internet access captures the use of technology to internalize transactions 
and expand market opportunities for Transnational Criminal Enterprises (Enderwick, 
2009, 2016).   An increasing proportion of drug users are obtaining drugs over the darknet, 
and the internet has also reshaped relationships between suppliers, intermediaries, and 
buyers in drug trafficking (Lavorgna, 2014; United National Office of Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC), 2017b).   Greater restrictions to voluntary exchanges (i.e. lower economic 
freedom and higher tariff rates) and less accessibility to technology are also expected to 
be detrimental to economic growth and political stability. 
 
In addition to the U.S. drug prohibition policy and the Ownership, Location, and 
Internalization variables, Table 2 also lists an instrumental variable used to identify U.S. 
political administration’s views toward illicit drug control (prohibition) and a proxy for 
U.S. cocaine demand.  The instrumental variable takes a value of one for Republican 
administrations and zero otherwise.  Republican administrations are expected to have 
tougher prohibition policies and allocate greater funding to illicit drug control.22 Finally, 
the U.S. cocaine retail price index adjusted for purity is used as a proxy of demand.  
 
5. Data 
 
Data from 1996-2015 is used in the analysis for Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela.  Cocaine-coca seizure 
data was obtained from the United National Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2017a), 
and data for coca cultivation and potential pure cocaine (hydrochloride) production was 
obtained from the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) (2016).  Coca 
                                                          
21 Tariff rates were included as a proxy for international market regulation.  Tariffs are expected to indicate 
difficulties in moving products internationally.  There is evidence of Transnational Criminal Enterprises 
using legitimate commerce to smuggle illicit drugs. Boyum and Reuter (2005) point that in the early 1990s 
cocaine had been smuggled through legitimate commerce, a practice that became more common with the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Transnational Criminal Enterprises therefore should be 
negatively impacted by tariff rates, because countries with high tariffs generally impose more restrictions and 
a greater cost of allowing products to enter their country. 
22 Our data shows Republican administrations spent 2.6 percent more on international and interdiction 
policies than Democratic administrations. Discussion of the exclusion, exogeneity, and relevance are 
presented in the results section.  
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eradication data including both manual and spraying eradication methods were obtained 
from the ONDCP and the UNODC (Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), 
2016; United National Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 2010a, 2011, 2015, 2017a).  
Data for U.S. interdiction expenditures (cocaine-coca transit reductions) and international 
expenditures (production site supply limitations) were taken from the National Drug 
Control Strategy budget summary reports for the 1998 fiscal year through the 2017 fiscal 
year (Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), 2018).23   
 
The political stability and control-of-corruption index were obtained from the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators database (The World Bank, 2017b).  Minimum wage 
data was obtained from the International Labour Organization (ILO), DatosMacro, the 
national institute of Bolivian statistics, and the national bank of Colombia (Banco de la 
República de Colombia, 2018; Datosmacro, 2018; Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE), 
2018; International Labour Organization (ILO), 2018). The Penn World Table version 9.0 
provided the human capital index (Feenstra et al., 2013). The distance measures were 
obtained from the geographic data provided by the Portland State University Department 
of Economics (Porland State University, 2009). The Index of Economic Freedom was 
obtained from the Heritage Foundation’s 2018 report (The Heritage Foundation, 2018).  
Real GDP statistics, the unemployment rate, openness, tariff rate, and internet access 
variables were obtained from the World Development Indicators database (The World 
Bank, 2017a). The U.S. cocaine retail price index adjusted for purity was taken from the 
World Drug Report 2019 (United Nations, 2019). 
 
 
6. Econometric Estimation 
 
Two approaches, a Maximum Likelihood with Missing Values estimator (MLMV) and 
Multiple Imputation analysis, were used to deal with missing values in the data when 
estimating the impact of U.S. drug prohibition policy on the illicit drug supply indicators, 
real GDP growth, and political stability.  MLMV is used in the estimation of coca 
cultivation (equation 1 for 2i  ), potential cocaine production (equation 1 for 3i  ), and 
coca eradication (equation 1 for 4i  ), using Stata’s Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) 
command.  The MLMV method assumes joint normality of all variables and allow us to 
obtain more efficient estimates when missing values are Missing at Random (MAR) 
(StataCorp, 2017).  MLMV estimates the log-likelihood of missing data by grouping data 
according to missing value patterns  (StataCorp, 2017).  
 
Multiple Imputation analysis is used to estimate crop seizures (equation 1 for 1i  ), 
and the effect of prohibition (equations 2 and 3) in Latin American countries.24  The 
                                                          
23 1996-2015 final expenditure data was reported from several federal agencies but during that time frame 
some agencies were terminated or merged, while other agencies/programs were added to the National Drug 
Control Budget.  For consistency, we used the interdiction and international expenditures from those 
agencies/programs that were included in the 2012 fiscal year budget (Office of National Drug Control Policy 
(ONDCP), 2011).  
24 The MLMV approach is not used because the assumption of multivariate normality of all variables does 
not hold. The MLMV is used for the estimation of cultivation, potential cocaine production, and eradication 
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multiple imputation approach minimizes bias, maximizes the use of available information, 
and obtains appropriate estimates of uncertainty (UCLA: Statistical Consulting Group, 
2018b).  There are three steps in the multiple imputation method:  1) imputation, 2) 
analysis, and 3) pooling.  In the imputation step, the missing values are replaced with m  
multiple sets25 of estimated values to obtain m  complete data sets.  Stata’s multiple 
imputation (MI) command was used to impute missing values using chained equations.  
The estimation of missing data by chained equations uses separate conditional distributions 
for each imputed variable (UCLA: Statistical Consulting Group, 2018b).26  In the analysis 
step, each of the m  data sets are used to perform the regression analysis.  In step three, 
pooling, the coefficients and standard errors are adjusted to reflect the uncertainty of the 
imputed values.  Maximum Likelihood estimators and robust standard errors were 
estimated in each regression.  Goodness of fit statistics (i.e. R-Squared) were calculated 
using the method outlined by the Institute for Digital Research and Education (IDRE) 
(UCLA: Statistical Consulting Group, 2018a).27 
 
Consistent estimates require explanatory variables to be independent of the unobserved 
time-varying shocks and country’s heterogeneity.  The Correlated Random Effects (CRE) 
framework was used to account for the correlation between the explanatory variables and 
the country’s unobserved heterogeneity (Saenz and Thompson, 2017).  The CRE 
framework was implemented by including the average of time-varying explanatory 
variables as covariates in each estimated regression.  A Control Function (CF) approach 
was used to control for the correlation between the U.S. drug prohibition policy variable 
and the time-varying shocks that affects the Transnational Criminal Enterprises locational 
decisions.  The CF approach includes the estimated residuals from the prohibition policy 
regression,28  as well as the explanatory variables, in the estimation of equations (1), (2) 
and (3).  Significance of the differential effects of prohibition, were assessed by using a 
significant-joint hypothesis of the prohibition and its interaction effect.29  
 
Highly correlated variables were excluded from the analysis to avoid multicollinearity.  
A Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for each variable was estimated after excluding highly 
                                                          
because it is easier to implement and produces similar results to those of multiple imputation without 
requiring imputed values (UCLA: Statistical Consulting Group, 2018b).   
25 Twenty-five multiple sets were imputed for the estimation of equation 1 for 1i  (i.e. seizures), using 
Data Set 1. Fifty multiple sets were imputed for the estimation of equations 2 and 3 (i.e. real GDP growth 
and political stability) using Data Set 3. The number of imputations were chosen so that the number of 
imputations were higher than the highest Fraction of Missing Information as discussed in UCLA: Statistical 
Consulting Group (2018b).  
26 The Stata’s command used was “mi impute chained” using predicted mean matching (PMM) as the option 
for the univariate imputation method. Stata’s PMM option matches the missing value to the observed value 
with the closest linear prediction. The PMM is used because it maintains the distribution of the observed 
values in the missing part of the data (StataCorp, 2013).  The truncated regression option was used in the 
imputation of tariff rate for the estimation of real GDP growth and political stability because it produced a 
distribution of the imputed values closer to the distribution of the observed values in comparison to PMM.  
27 IDRE established methodology when using multiple imputation to calculate the R-Squared.   
28 The prohibition variable was regressed on the instrumental variable, and same set of covariates and 
observations used to estimate each of the thi  illicit drug supply indicator (equations 1) and impact indicators 
(equations 2 and 3). 
29 Joint hypothesis are based on F-statistic tests and are less affected by multicollinearity (Wooldridge, 2016). 
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correlated variables (see Table 3 below) for three data sets.  Data Set 1 includes 
observations for the Latin American countries and the U.S. to estimate cocaine-coca 
seizures. Data Set 2 includes the observations for the main cocaine-coca producers (i.e. 
Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia) and it is used in the estimation of coca cultivation, potential 
cocaine production, and coca eradication.  Data Set 3 includes data for the Latin American 
countries to assess the impact of U.S. drug prohibition policy in the region.  Results from 
Table 3 confirmed multicollinearity is not a potential problem since the values for the VIFs 
are below 10.30 
 
 
Table 3. Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) 
Variable 
Data Set 1 Data Set 2  Data Set 3 
No. Obs. 360 No. Obs. 60  No. Obs. 340 
Log(Prohibition) – U.S. Interdiction 
Expenditure 
1.82 ---  1.95 
Log(Prohibition) – U.S. International 
Expenditure 
--- 1.95  1.72 
Control-of-Corruption Index 4.04 1.74  9.21 
Unemployment Rate 3.39 6.42  3.81 
Relative Minimum Wage 3.04 3.67  2.65 
Human Capital Index 3.68 4.18  6.05 
Openness 1.45 6.62  1.98 
Log(Distance) --- ---  2.18 
Economic Freedom 2.74 3.36  2.54 
Tariff Rate 3.68 ---  3.92 
Internet Access 7.86 ---  8.11 
Log(U.S. Cocaine Price) 2.93 1.87  3.4 
Big Country 1.3 ---  1.47 
---: not applicable (variable not used in the estimation). Same Multiple Imputation analyses used in the 
estimation of Model 1 (equation 1 for 1i  ; seizures) and Model 2 (real GDP growth and political stability) 
were used in the VIF estimation for Data Set 1 and Data Set 3, respectively. MLMV was used to estimate 
the VIF for Data Set 2. 
 
Three steps were used in the estimation of the thi  illicit drug supply indicators (i.e. 
seizures, cultivation, potential production, and eradication) from equation (1), and the 
impact indicators (i.e. real GDP growth and political stability) from equations (2) and (3). 
First, the U.S. drug prohibition variable was regressed on the instrumental variable, the 
Ownership, Location, and Internalization variables, the demand proxy, the big country 
dummy variable, and the average of time-varying explanatory variables.  Second, we obtain 
the estimated residuals from the prohibition regression in step one and included them as a 
covariate in the estimation of the illicit drug supply and impact indicators. Third, we regress 
                                                          
30 Wooldridge (2016) states that choosing an arbitrary value for the VIF to conclude that multicollinearity is 
a problem is difficult. However, Wooldridge (2016) points to choosing a VIF greater than 10 to establish 
multicollinearity is a problem.  Wooldridge (2016) argues that a VIF greater than 10 is equivalent to an R-
squared from regressing the explanatory variable on all other independent variables of above 0.9.   
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each thi  illicit drug supply indicator on the estimated residuals obtained in step two, the 
prohibition variable, and XY.31 We regress again each thi illicit drug supply indicator 
including one interaction effect at a time.  For the estimation of the impact indicators, the 
independent variables used in the system of equations (2) and (3) were the estimated 
residuals obtained in step two, the prohibition variable, and XY.  If the estimated residuals 
were insignificant, they were dropped, and the equation was re-estimated using the 
remaining variables.   
 
 
6.1 Missing at Random (MAR) Assumption 
 
For the MLMV and the Multiple Imputation analysis to minimize bias and obtain more 
efficient estimators, missing values have to be Missing at Random (MAR) (Newman, 
2014). According to Allison (2010), data for a variable is MAR if the missingness of the 
variable depends on observed data, and not on the measures of the variable itself after 
controlling for the observed data.   There is no available test to assess if the data is MAR, 
but we can diagnose MAR by looking at the correlation between missingness and observed 
data, and by estimating the probability of missingness as a function of the observed data.  
 
Table 4 presents the percentage of missing observations in each of the data sets used in 
the estimations.  Based on the percentages of missing observations, we analyze the MAR 
assumption for those variables where the percentage of missing observations in greater 
than 5 percent.32 
 
Table 4. Variables with missing data (percentage of missing observations)  
Variable 
Data Set 1: 
Cocaine-Coca 
Seizures 
Estimation 
Data Set 2 
Cocaine-Coca 
Producers 
Estimation 
Data Set 3 
Latin American Countries 
Estimation 
No. Obs. 360 No. Obs. 60 No. Obs. 340 
Political Stability --- --- 15 
Cocaine-Coca Seizures 0.28 --- --- 
Control-of-Corruption 15 15 15 
Relative Minimum 
Wage 
6.11 1.67 6.47 
Openness 0.28 0 0.29 
Tariff Rate 7.22 --- 7.65 
---: not applicable (variable not used in the estimation). Missingness is due to the source’s reporting of the 
data, and not the value of the variable itself.  
 
                                                          
31 XY stands for the Ownership, Location, and Internalization variables, demand proxy, Big Country dummy, 
and the average of time-varying explanatory variables. The following variables were excluded because of 
multicollinearity issues: the distance variable was excluded from the estimation of seizures, cultivation, 
potential production, and eradication; the tariff rate, internet access, and the Big Country dummy were 
excluded from the estimation of cultivation, potential production, and eradication. 
32 Variables with less than 5 percent missing data only represent one missing observation in each data set 
and are not expected to influence the bias or efficiency of the estimator. 
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A missingness-dummy variable was created for each variable with more than 5 percent 
of missing observations. The missingness-dummy variable takes a value of 1 if the variable 
has a missing observation and zero if otherwise.  These dummy variables were used to 
estimate the pairwise correlations between missing data and the observed variables33 (Table 
5), and to estimate the probability of missingness as a function of the observed data (Table 
6).  
 
For the data used in the estimation of cocaine-coca seizures (i.e. Data Set 1), Table 5 
indicates the missingness in the control-of-corruption index, relative minimum wage, and 
tariff rate variables are significantly associated (i.e. correlated) with observed data. 
Estimation of the probability of missingness in Table 6 confirms that the missingness 
depends on the observed data itself. For example, missingness in the control-of-corruption 
index can be predicted by the observed values of cocaine-coca seizure data, human capital 
index, economic freedom, openness, and internet access. 
 
Similarly, for the data used in the estimation of coca cultivation, potential cocaine 
production, and coca eradication (i.e. Data Set 2), Table 5 indicates that missingness in the 
control-of-corruption index is significantly correlated with the observed data. Estimation 
of the missingness probability in the control-of-corruption index in Table 6 indicates that 
missingness depends on the observed values of U.S. international expenditures, 
unemployment rate, relative minimum wage, and economic freedom.  
 
Finally, for the data set used in the estimation of the impact of U.S. drug prohibition 
policy in Latin American countries (i.e. Data Set 3), the pairwise correlation (Table 5) 
estimations indicate that missingness is significantly correlated with the observed data. A 
further assessment of the dependence of missingness on observed data can be predicted by 
the probability estimations of missingness as shown in Table 6.  For example, missingness 
in the political stability variable and the tariff rate depend on the observed prohibition 
values as measured by U.S. international expenditures.  
                                                          
33 Observed variables are understood to be those with no missing observations or less than 5 percent of 
missing data 
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Table 5. Pairwise correlation between variables with complete data and variables with missing data a  
  
Data Set 1 
Cocaine-Coca Seizure Estimation 
 
Data Set 2 
Cocaine-Coca 
Producers 
Estimation 
 Data Set 3 
Latin American Countries Estimation 
Variables -Complete 
Data 
V
a
ri
a
b
le
s 
M
is
si
n
g
 
D
a
ta
 
Control-of- 
Corruption 
Relative 
Minimum 
Wage 
Tariff 
Rate 
 Control-of- 
Corruption 
 Political 
Stability 
Control-of- 
Corruption 
Relative 
Minimum 
Wage 
Tariff 
Rate 
Cocaine-Coca 
Seizures b 
 -0.12** -0.084 -0.02  ---  --- --- --- --- 
Coca Cultivation  --- --- ---  0.016  --- --- --- --- 
Potential Cocaine 
Production 
 --- --- ---  0.04  --- --- --- --- 
Coca Eradication  --- --- ---  -0.13  --- --- --- --- 
Real GDP Growth  --- --- ---  ---  -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.082 0.019 
U.S. Interdiction 
Expenditure 
 -0.31*** -0.11** -0.27***  ---  -0.31*** -0.31*** -0.11** -0.28*** 
U.S. International 
Expenditure 
 --- --- ---  -0.47***  -0.47*** -0.47*** -0.088 -0.34*** 
Unemployment Rate  0.13** -0.051 0.0084  0.14  0.14*** 0.14*** -0.058 0.0013 
Relative Minimum 
Wage 
 --- --- ---  -0.2  --- --- --- --- 
Human Capital Index  -0.13** -0.0091 -0.13**  -0.28**  -0.17*** -0.17*** 0.041 -0.12** 
Openness  -0.083 0.055 0.11**  -0.27**  -0.087 -0.087 0.039 0.1* 
Distance  --- --- ---  ---  -0.000000061 -0.000000061 -0.035 -0.12** 
Economic Freedom  0.11** -0.051 0.027  0.25*  0.13** 0.13** -0.028 0.06 
Internet Access  -0.34*** 0.11** -0.13**  ---  -0.37*** -0.37*** 0.16*** -0.12** 
U.S. Cocaine Price  -0.27*** 0.26*** -0.068  -0.27**  -0.27*** -0.27*** 0.27*** -0.07 
***, **, * indicates significant effects at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. ---: not applicable (variable not used in the estimation). 
a We investigate the correlation between variables with no missing data or with less than 5 percent of missing data, and variables with more than 5 percent missing data. 
A dummy variable was constructed for each variable with more than 5 percent missing data to estimate the pairwise correlation. 
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Table 6. Logistic regression (odds ratio) for missing data – Data Set 1 and Data Set 2 
 Data Set 1  
Used in Estimation of: Seizures  
Data Set 2  
Used in Estimation of: Cultivation, 
Potential Cocaine Production, and 
Eradication  
 Control-of- 
Corruption 
Relative 
Minimum 
Wage 
Tariff Rate 
Control-
of- 
Corruption 
Control-
of- 
Corruption 
Control-
of- 
Corruption 
Cocaine-Coca 
Seizures 
0.999** 0.999** 1 
--- --- --- 
(0.0000012) (0.000014) (0.00000078) 
Coca Cultivation --- --- --- 
1 
--- --- 
(0.000024) 
Potential Cocaine 
Production 
--- --- --- --- 
1.003 
--- 
(0.0051) 
Coca Eradication --- --- --- --- --- 
1 
(0.00002) 
U.S. Interdiction 
Expenditure 
1 0.998*** 0.998*** 
--- --- --- 
(0.00039) (0.00057) (0.00047) 
U.S. International 
Expenditure 
--- --- --- 
0.998** 0.998* 0.998* 
(0.00099) (0.001) (0.0011) 
Unemployment 
Rate 
1.009 1.085 0.996 1.587** 1.479* 1.621** 
(0.048) (0.095) (0.062) (0.35) (0.33) (0.34) 
Relative Minimum 
Wage 
--- --- --- 0.587** 0.572** 0.58** 
   (0.13) (0.15) (0.14) 
Human Capital 
Index 
3.559** 14.08** 0.278 1.102 0.656 1.179 
(2.12) (18.9) (0.23) (4.73) (3.003) (4.96) 
Openness 
0.986** 0.989 1.017*** 0.86 0.842 0.857 
(0.0067) (0.0091) (0.0056) (0.12) (0.13) (0.11) 
Economic Freedom 
1.07** 0.999 1.02 1.916* 2.006* 1.892* 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.041) (0.7) (0.77) (0.65) 
Internet Access 
0.86*** 0.908*** 1.011 
--- --- --- 
(0.042) (0.031) (0.027) 
U.S. Cocaine Price 
1.006 1.152*** 1.01 1.014 1.011 1.019 
(0.011) (0.029) (0.017) (0.061) (0.06) (0.053) 
***, **, * indicates significant effects at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively.  Odds ratios reported. 
Robust standard errors of coefficients in parenthesis. ---: not applicable (variable not used in the estimation). 
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Table 6. Logistic regression (odds ratio) for missing data (continued) – Data Set 3 
` Political Stability 
 Control-of- 
Corruption 
 Relative Minimum 
Wage 
 
Tariff Rate 
Real GDP Growth 
0.913 0.856**  0.913 0.856**  0.873 0.852*  1.064 1.039 
(0.055) (0.056)  (0.055) (0.056)  (0.078) (0.072)  (0.073) (0.082) 
U.S. Interdiction 
Expenditure 
1.001 
--- 
 1.001 
--- 
 0.998*** 
--- 
 0.998*** 
--- 
(0.00045)  (0.00045)  (0.00049)  (0.00048) 
U.S. International 
Expenditure 
--- 
0.998***  
--- 
0.998***  
--- 
0.997*  
--- 
0.996*** 
(0.00036)  (0.00036)  (0.0018)  (0.00095) 
Unemployment 
Rate 
1.019 0.995  1.019 0.995  1.034 1.024  1.005 0.997 
(0.05) (0.053)  (0.05) (0.053)  (0.061) (0.063)  (0.062) (0.073) 
Human Capital 
Index 
3.602 3.253  3.602 3.253  3.191 1.874  0.609 0.539 
(2.88) (2.83)  (2.88) (2.83)  (4.24) (2.37)  (0.54) (0.5) 
Opennessb 
0.993 0.994  0.993 0.994  1.004 1.005  1.009 1.013* 
(0.0067) (0.0073)  (0.0067) (0.0073)  (0.0084) (0.0084)  (0.0062) (0.0073) 
Distance 
0.999 0.999  0.999 0.999  1 0.999  0.999* 0.999** 
(0.00021) (0.00022)  (0.00021) (0.00022)  (0.00027) (0.00023)  (0.00021) (0.00021) 
Economic 
Freedom 
1.057* 1.059*  1.057* 1.059*  1.029 1.029  1.031 1.03 
(0.033) (0.036)  (0.033) (0.036)  (0.041) (0.028)  (0.042) (0.041) 
Internet Access 
0.739*** 0.81***  0.739*** 0.81***  0.925** 0.955  1.009 1.045 
(0.066) (0.047)  (0.066) (0.047)  (0.031) (0.029)  (0.029) (0.033) 
U.S. Cocaine Price 
1.025* 1.054***  1.025* 1.054***  1.128*** 1.112***  1.007 1.015 
(0.015) (0.016)  (0.015) (0.016)  (0.026) (0.031)  (0.019) (0.02) 
***, **, * indicates significant effects at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively.  Odds ratios reported. Robust standard errors of 
coefficients in parenthesis. ---: not applicable (variable not used in the estimation). 
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7. Results 
 
An instrumental variable (IV) was used to identify the impact of U.S. drug prohibition policy 
on the illicit drug supply indicators, real GDP growth, and political stability. For the instrument to 
be valid after controlling for other relevant factors, the IV needs to predict changes in the size of 
U.S. drug prohibition policy (i.e. relevance assumption), and be unrelated to changes in the illicit 
drug supply and impact indicators (i.e. exclusion assumption) while being uncorrelated to the error 
terms in equations 1, 2, and 3 (i.e. exogeneity assumption).34  
 
We can explore the relevance of the IV to predict U.S. drug prohibition policy by referring to 
the estimation of factors affecting U.S. interdiction and international expenditure in Table 7.  Data 
Set 1 (i.e. column 1 in Table 7 using data for all countries with seizure values) is used to assess the 
factors affecting prohibition when U.S. drug prohibition policy is measured as U.S. interdiction 
expenditure. Data Set 3 (i.e. column 4 in Table 7 using data for Latin American countries) is used 
to assess factors affecting prohibition when U.S. drug prohibition policy is measured as U.S. 
international expenditure. Results indicate that the IV significantly impacts U.S. drug prohibition 
policy after controlling for all other relevant factors making the U.S. political administration 
dummy a relevant instrument. 
 
The IV also needs to have no direct effect on the illicit supply indicators, real GDP growth, 
and political stability (i.e. exclusion restriction).  Table 8 presents the estimation of the illicit 
supply indicators, real GDP growth, and political stability.  As shown in Table 8, the IV does not 
significantly impact seizures, cultivation, potential cocaine production, real GDP growth, and 
political stability; therefore the U.S. political administration dummy satisfies the exclusion 
restriction for all dependent variables, except eradication.35  However, there is no reason to believe 
that the election of a Democratic or Republican administration in the U.S. has a direct impact on 
eradication, expect through the effect of the U.S. drug prohibition policy. The average of coca 
eradication (hectares) during a Democratic administration was not statistically different than the 
average of coca eradication during a Republican administration.36  
 
In addition, the exogeneity of the IV might be called into question if the factors influencing 
the election of a Democratic or Republican administration also affect the dependent variables (i.e. 
illicit supply indicators, real GDP growth, and political stability), and are not accounted for in the 
estimation.  Historical political attitudes in the United States have been shaped by family attitudes, 
gender, religion, race, ethnicity, and geographical region in the U.S. (Independence Hall 
Association, 2019). Those factors affecting political attitudes are different from those we 
theorized, in the context of Transnational Criminal Enterprises, affect illicit supply indicators. In 
addition, factors affecting historical political attitudes in the U.S. are different from the factors 
affecting economic growth and political stability in Latin American countries. 
                                                          
34 Wooldridge (2016) defines the exogeneity and exclusion assumptions as the instrument exogeneity assumption. In 
here, we are more specific by defining exogeneity in terms of the correlation of the instrument with the error term, 
and the exclusion restriction as the instrumental variable not having a partial effect on the dependent variable after 
controlling for other relevant variables.  
35 The IV significantly impacts eradication at the 5 percent significance level. 
36 A t-test on the equality of means was not statistically significant at the standard significance levels.  
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Table 7. Factors affecting prohibition (lognormal estimates) a; b 
Dependent Variable 
Log(U.S. 
Interdiction 
Expenditure) 
Log(U.S. 
International 
Expenditure) 
Log(U.S. 
Interdiction 
Expenditure) 
Log(U.S. 
International 
Expenditure) 
 
Data Set 1 
Cocaine-Coca 
Seizures 
Data Set 2  
Cocaine-Coca 
Producers 
Data Set 3  
Latin American Countries 
 No. Obs. 360 No. Obs. 60 No. Obs. 340 
Independent Variables Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
IV 
0.11*** 0.25 0.084*** 0.27*** 
(0.026) (0.16) (0.026) (0.062) 
Control-of-Corruption 
Index 
0.0046 0.48 0.101** 0.21** 
(0.027) (0.38) (0.046) (0.1) 
Unemployment Rate 
-0.0019 0.071*** -0.0051 0.0047 
(0.005) (0.025) (0.0054) (0.011) 
Relative Minimum 
Wage 
-0.0013 -0.00088 0.0017 0.0059** 
(0.00092) (0.021) (0.0018) (0.0029) 
Human Capital Index 
-0.0025 1.22*** 0.13* 0.32** 
(0.04) (0.39) (0.072) (0.15) 
Openness 
0.00066* 0.014* 0.00013 -0.00058 
(0.00036) (0.0079) (0.00045) (0.00094) 
Log(Distance) d --- --- 
-0.053 -0.13 
(0.035) (0.079) 
Economic Freedom 
-0.0028 0.011 -0.0022 -0.0011 
(0.002) (0.012) (0.0019) (0.004) 
Tariff Rate c 
-0.035*** 
--- 
-0.04*** -0.069*** 
(0.0047) (0.0049) (0.011) 
Internet Access c 
0.0033** 
--- 
0.00033 -0.0042 
(0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0032) 
Log(U.S. Price Cocaine) 
0.076 0.73** 0.071 0.61*** 
(0.069) (0.34) (0.072) (0.15) 
Big Country 
0.015 
--- 
-0.0038 -0.028 
(0.027) (0.029) (0.063) 
Observations 360 60 340 340 
R-Squared 0.47 0.52 0.49 0.44 
***, **, * indicates significant effects at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. Robust standard errors 
in parenthesis. ---: not applicable (variable not used in the estimation due to high correlation with other regressors). 
a Data Set 1 includes the Latin American countries and the U.S., Data Set 2 includes main cocaine-coca producers (i.e. 
Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia), and Data Set 3 includes Latin American countries as listed in the data section.  
b Implementation of the Correlated Random Effects (CRE) approach involves the control of covariates that statistically 
change over time (results not reported).  Mean of variables that statistically change over time and have a correlation 
higher than 0.8 with other covariates used in the regression are excluded to avoid multicollinearity. Therefore, for each 
data set the following variables are included: Data Set 1 - mean of the unemployment rate and tariff rate; Data Set 2 - no 
additional means are included; Data Set 3 - mean of the unemployment rate, tariff rate, and internet access.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Review of Economic Analysis forthcoming, 2020 (12)
25 
 
 
 
Table 8: Testing exclusion restriction of IV  
 
Log(Cocaine-
Coca 
Seizures) 
Log(Coca 
Cultivation) 
Log(Potential 
Cocaine 
Production) 
Log(Coca 
Eradication) 
Real 
GDP 
Growth 
Political 
Stability 
 
Data Set 1 
No. Obs. 360 
Data Set 2 - No. Obs. 60 
Data Set 3 
No. Obs. 340 
Independent Variables  
IV 
0.046 -0.084 -0.059 0.5** -0.37 -0.11 
(0.25) (0.091) (0.13) (0.22) (0.47) (0.068) 
Control-of-
Corruption Index 
-0.32 0.43* 0.27 -0.7 1.05 0.17* 
(0.26) (0.23) (0.29) (0.68) (0.88) (0.092) 
Unemployment 
Rate 
-0.02 -0.016 0.019 -0.029 -0.38*** -0.022** 
(0.043) (0.015) (0.019) (0.036) (0.11) (0.0098) 
Relative 
Minimum Wage 
0.026*** 0.057*** 0.045*** 0.13*** -0.0093 -0.016*** 
(0.0071) (0.013) (0.013) (0.031) (0.028) (0.0032) 
Human Capital 
Index 
1.91*** -1.90*** -0.29 -4.03*** 0.59 -0.048 
(0.34) (0.29) (0.33) (0.69) (1.04) (0.13) 
Openness 
-0.0027 -0.0049 -0.0022 0.0037 0.032*** 0.0048*** 
(0.0029) (0.005) (0.0060) (0.014) (0.0067) (0.00079) 
Log(Distance) --- --- --- --- 
-0.12 0.49*** 
(0.71) (0.074) 
Economic 
Freedom 
-0.033* -0.017** -0.015 -0.016 -0.073** -0.011*** 
(0.017) (0.0077) (0.0095) (0.024) (0.032) (0.0035) 
Tariff Rate 
-0.047 
--- --- --- 
-0.13 0.0046 
(0.05) (0.088) (0.01) 
Internet Access 
0.0024 
--- --- --- 
0.028 0.0074** 
(0.01) (0.025) (0.0032) 
Log(U.S. Cocaine 
Price) 
-0.069 0.39* -0.049 1.37*** -5.32*** -0.24 
(0.58) (0.21) (0.28) (0.5) (1.01) (0.15) 
Big Country 
3.89*** 
--- --- --- 
1.43*** -0.73*** 
(0.24) (0.44) (0.06) 
R-Squared 0.62 0.89 0.63 0.83 0.84 
***, **, * indicates significant effects at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. Robust standard errors 
in parenthesis. ---: not applicable (variable not used in the estimation). The MLMV approach is used in the estimation 
of coca cultivation, potential cocaine production, and coca eradication.  For the MLMV estimation, we fail to reject 
the Jarque-Bera test of normality at all standard significance levels for the coca eradication and potential cocaine 
production estimations. We fail to reject the Jarque-Bera test of normality at the 1 percent significance level for the 
coca eradication estimation. Multiple Imputation analysis was used in the estimation of cocaine-coca seizures, real 
GDP growth, and political stability.  
 
Table 7 also reveals the factors that significantly affect U.S. prohibition in Latin America (i.e. 
columns 3 and 4).  Results indicate Latin American countries that have less corrupted 
governments, a more educated population, and fewer restrictions on international trade are 
associated with greater U.S. expenditures for illicit drug interdiction and international drug control 
efforts.  U.S. drug prohibition policy in Latin American countries appears to be driven by the 
government’s ability to manage those resources allocated for illicit drug supply control and the 
restrictions imposed to international trade.  In addition, higher retail prices for cocaine in the U.S. 
are associated with greater U.S. expenditures on international drug control efforts.    
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Tables 9-14 show results for the illicit drug supply indicators estimation.  For brevity, Table 
13 reports only the significant estimates from the regression run for each thi  illicit drug supply 
indicator before including any interaction of U.S. drug prohibition policy with the Ownership, 
Location, and Internalization variables.  Table 14 reports the estimates for significant joint 
hypothesis of the prohibition and its corresponding interaction effect.  
 
Table 13 results indicate that U.S. drug prohibition policy significantly impacts cocaine-coca 
supply at the source but not in transit.  Table 13 reveals that a 10 percent increase in U.S. drug 
prohibition policy spending, measured as international expenditure, reduces potential cocaine 
production by 3.5 percent and increases on-site coca eradications by approximately 26 percent.  
Caulkins and Reuter (2010) report that significant cocaine-coca supply control efforts at the source 
country are viewed as inefficient, since the cost of cultivating and refining the drug is less than 1 
percent of the U.S. cocaine retail price. However, Caulkins and Reuter (2010) point that illegality 
and enforcement can keep U.S. cocaine retail prices higher and availability to the consumer much 
lower that would be case if there were no prohibition or enforcement.  
 
Table 13 results are consistent with other authors’ argument that U.S. drug prohibition policy 
has not significantly disrupted the cocaine-coca supply in transit. Seizures insignificantly affect 
the Transnational Criminal Enterprise financially because smuggling costs are a small percentage 
of the final U.S. cocaine retail price and because Transnational Criminal Enterprises change 
smuggling routes thereby hedging against the risk of seizures  (Andreas, 2000; Caulkins and 
Reuter, 2010; Keck and Correa-Cabrera, 2015; Moore, 1990). Successful interdiction policies in 
one country have only displaced operations to other locations, without reducing the amount of 
drugs transacted. Mejia and Restrepo (2014) reveal that successful interdiction policies in 
Colombia in 2007, resulted with the displacement of cocaine-coca production and trafficking 
organizations.37 Similarly,  Giommoni et al., (2017) found that greater seizures failed to prevent 
the formation of heroin trafficking flows in Europe.  
 
Our results reveal that the Ownership variable, control-of-corruption index, significantly 
affects Transnational Criminal Enterprises when it comes to on-site cocaine-coca supply.  Greater 
control- of-corruption advantages Transnational Criminal Enterprises by significantly increasing 
coca cultivation, potential cocaine production, and reducing coca eradication.  Our results support 
Mudambi and Paul (2003) assertion that less corruption decreases production costs for 
Transnational Criminal Enterprises thereby facilitating their expansion. This study’s results also 
point out that the monetary cost of brides are higher than other monetary/non-monetary costs 
associated with the production of cocaine-coca. 
 
Location variables, such as the state of the labor market (i.e. unemployment rate and relative 
minimum wage), human capital levels, and openness, significantly affect Transnational Criminal 
Enterprises locational decisions in Latin America. As unemployment rates increase, Transnational 
Criminal Enterprises gain advantages due to increases in potential cocaine production and 
reductions in coca eradication. Unemployment rates have been found to have a positive  
association with the size of the shadow economy as economic downturns drive unemployed 
individuals into the shadow economy (Dell’Anno and Solomon, 2008). Transnational Criminal 
                                                          
37 Coca cultivation was displaced to Peru and Bolivia, cocaine processing to Venezuela, and trafficking 
organizations to Mexico and Central America.  
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Enterprises benefit from individuals driven to the shadow economy due to lost employment. In the 
case of relative minimum wages, Transnational Criminal Enterprises gain advantages with higher 
local wages as those are associated with higher coca cultivation and potential cocaine production, 
but those advantages are diminished as higher local wages increase the expected seizures and 
eradication efforts. According to Reuter (1992), crop eradication efforts increase the risks and costs 
to farmers which should be reflected on the income they receive in order for them to stay in the 
market. Thus, higher wages38 become an incentive for farmers to increase cocaine-coca production 
in order to cover the risks farmers face as result of prohibition.  On the other hand, higher minimum 
wages have also been found to spur productivity and increase output (Booth and Frank, 1999).  
Results showed in Table 13 also indicate that reduced human capital increases coca cultivation. 
Reduced human capital levels lower the opportunity cost of crime (Lochner, 2004), and also 
provides a cheaper labor force.  Greater globalization (i.e. greater openness) also benefits 
Transnational Criminal Enterprises by reducing on-site eradications.  The effect of openness on 
Transnational Criminal Enterprises does not support Enderwick (2009)’s discussion on how 
globalization  generates income inequality and provides an opportunity for Translational Criminal 
Enterprises to target marginalized segments of the population, as globalization does not 
significantly impact on-site cocaine-coca production.   
 
Table 13 also reveals that the Internalization variable, economic freedom, has a significant 
impact on the locational decisions of Transnational Criminal Enterprises.  Greater economic 
freedom becomes disadvantageous to Transnational Criminal Enterprises by reducing coca 
cultivation. This result potentially signals changes in the producers’ behavior by giving them 
incentives to engage in the legal economy. Our results support Muñoz-Mora et al. (2018) and 
Felbab-Brown (2014) discussion on the importance of property rights, and access to productive 
resources and markets in decreasing the size of illicit drug cultivation.  Results also indicate that 
increased levels of economic freedom lead to less seizures and on-site eradications.    
 
                                                          
38 We assume illegal wages reflect changes in legal wages. If legal wages increase, illegal wages will also have to 
increase to induce farmers to engage in illegal drug production since those activities involve higher risk.  
Review of Economic Analysis forthcoming, 2020 (12)
28 
 
 
 
 
Table 9. Cocaine-Coca seizures estimation (lognormal estimates) a  
Independent Variable Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
Log(Prohibition) 
0.66 0.76 1.11 0.84 -0.26 -0.36 -1.58 1.12 0.55 
(0.48) (0.50) (0.98) (0.7) (1.81) (0.82) (2.42) (0.84) (0.64) 
Log(Prohibition) by Control-of-
Corruption Index 
 0.38        
 (0.56)        
Log(Prohibition) by Unemployment 
Rate 
 -0.059  
(0.11) 
Log(Prohibition) by Relative 
Minimum Wage 
 -0.0065  
(0.014) 
Log(Prohibition) by Human Capital 
Index 
 0.38 
 
 
(0.71)  
Log(Prohibition) by Openness 
     0.016    
     (0.011)    
Log(Prohibition) by Economic 
Freedom 
 
 0.036  
 (0.039) 
Log(Prohibition) by Tariff Rate  
-0.07  
(0.11) 
Log(Prohibition) by Internet Access   
0.006 
(0.018) 
Control-of-Corruption Index 
-0.32 -3.33 -0.32 -0.34 -0.31 -0.34 -0.32 -0.33 -0.32 
(0.26) (4.43) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) 
Unemployment Rate 
-0.019 -0.027 0.44 -0.016 -0.021 -0.011 -0.026 -0.021 -0.019 
(0.043) (0.046) (0.88) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.045) (0.044) (0.043) 
Relative Minimum Wage 
0.027*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.078 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 
(0.0071) (0.0074) (0.0071) (0.11) (0.0074) (0.007) (0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0071) 
Human Capital Index 
1.92*** 1.99*** 1.9*** 1.9*** -1.1 1.87*** 1.99*** 1.92*** 1.92*** 
(0.34) (0.34) (0.33) (0.34) (5.65) (0.33) (0.35) (0.34) (0.34) 
Openness 
-0.0032 -0.0034 -0.0033 -0.0032 -0.0033 -0.13 -0.0033 -0.003 -0.0032 
(0.0029) (0.0029) (0.003) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.085) (0.003) (0.003) (0.0029) 
Economic Freedom 
-0.031* -0.033** -0.031* -0.03* -0.031* -0.029* -0.31 -0.031* -0.031* 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.31) (0.016) (0.017) 
Tariff Rate 
-0.023 -0.027 -0.021 -0.018 -0.026 -0.029 -0.026 0.53 -0.026 
(0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.057) (0.053) (0.053) (0.052) (0.87) (0.054) 
Internet Access 
-0.000015 -0.0043 0.00055 0.0015 -0.002 0.0024 -0.0031 0.0001 -0.047 
(0.01) (0.012) (0.01) (0.012) (0.011) (0.01) (0.011) (0.01) (0.15) 
Log(U.S. Cocaine Price) 
-0.08 0.022 -0.12 -0.12 -0.028 -0.16 -0.017 -0.11 -0.092 
(0.41) (0.44) (0.41) (0.43) (0.43) (0.42) (0.42) (0.42) (0.41) 
Big Country 
3.88*** 3.87*** 3.88*** 3.87*** 3.87*** 3.88*** 3.87*** 3.88*** 3.88*** 
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) 
a ***, **, * indicates 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. R-squared statistics for all regressions are 0.62. 
Prohibition is measured as U.S. interdiction expenditure. Results reported lognormal estimates after dropping not statistically significant residuals from the estimation 
of prohibition. Mean of the unemployment rate and tariff rate are included as regressors (estimates not reported).  We fail to reject the joint hypotheses that the 
prohibition and corresponding interaction effect are equal to zero at all significance levels.  
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Table 10. Coca cultivation estimation (lognormal estimates) 
Independent Variable Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
Residual 
    0.88**   
    (0.36)   
Log(Prohibition) 
-0.15 -0.89*** -0.58*** -0.78*** 1.82* 0.18 -0.95 
(0.11) (0.27) (0.16) (0.21) (0.97) (0.39) (1.42) 
Log(Prohibition) by Control-of-Corruption 
Index 
 -2.28***  
(0.73) 
Log(Prohibition) by Unemployment Rate  
0.048***  
(0.017) 
Log(Prohibition) by Relative Minimum Wage 
 
 0.039***  
(0.013) 
Log(Prohibition) by Human Capital Index 
 
 -1.18*** 
 
 
(0.42)  
Log(Prohibition) by Openness 
 
     -0.0081  
     (0.0084)  
Log(Prohibition) by Economic Freedom  
 0.012 
 (0.022) 
Control-of-Corruption Index 
0.51*** 16.8*** 0.53*** 0.43*** 0.79*** 0.58*** 0.49** 
(0.19) (5.12) (0.18) (0.16) (0.22) (0.21) (0.22) 
Unemployment Rate 
-0.0043 -0.018 -0.35*** 0.012 0.051** -0.0019 -0.0034 
(0.017) (0.016) (0.12) (0.013) (0.022) (0.017) (0.017) 
Relative Minimum Wage 
0.054*** 0.077*** 0.057*** -0.23** 0.068*** 0.051*** 0.053*** 
(0.0099) (0.011) (0.0083) (0.099) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) 
Human Capital Index 
-1.74*** -2.01*** -1.73*** -1.61*** 7.73** -1.71*** -1.77*** 
(0.32) (0.22) (0.27) (0.25) (3.13) (0.34) (0.33) 
Openness 
-0.0037 0.0013 -0.00067 -0.00081 0.015** 0.055 -0.0032 
(0.0041) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0032) (0.007) (0.061) (0.0037) 
Economic Freedom 
-0.015** -0.0098 -0.014* -0.015** -0.0018 -0.017** -0.11 
(0.0071) (0.0061) (0.007) (0.0067) (0.0082) (0.0074) (0.16) 
Log(U.S. Cocaine Price) 
0.58*** 0.38*** 0.58*** 0.59*** 0.84*** 0.61*** 0.58*** 
(0.11) (0.12) (0.1) (0.11) (0.14) (0.11) (0.12) 
R-Squared 0.9 0.93 0.91 0.92 0.91 0.9 0.9 
a ***, **, * indicates significant effects at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
Prohibition is measured as U.S. international expenditure. Results reported lognormal estimates obtained after dropping not statistically 
significant residuals from the estimation of prohibition.  P-values for the joint hypotheses that the prohibition and mth interaction effect equal 
to zero are: 0.004 (m= control-of-corruption index interaction); 0.001 (m = unemployment rate interaction); 0.0003 (m = relative minimum 
wage interaction); 0.0008 (m = human capital index interaction); 0.104 (m = openness interaction); and 0.38 (m = economic freedom 
interaction). We fail to reject the Jarque-Bera test of normality at all standard significance levels for all regressions. 
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Table 11. Potential cocaine production estimation (lognormal estimates) a 
Independent Variable Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
Log(Prohibition) 
-0.35*** -0.55* -0.54** -0.5* -0.11 0.0091 -0.24 
(0.099) (0.3) (0.21) (0.29) (1.12) (0.34) (1.42) 
Log(Prohibition) by Control-of-Corruption 
Index 
 -0.75  
(0.74) 
Log(Prohibition) by Unemployment Rate  
0.021  
(0.021) 
Log(Prohibition) by Relative Minimum 
Wage 
 
0.009 
 
(0.018) 
Log(Prohibition) by Human Capital Index  
-0.1   
(0.47)  
Log(Prohibition) by Openness 
     -0.0087  
     (0.0082) 
Log(Prohibition) by Economic Freedom  
 -0.0016 
 (0.022) 
Control-of-Corruption Index 
0.41* 5.89 0.41* 0.39* 0.41* 0.48** 0.38 
(0.22) (5.14) (0.21) (0.22) (0.22) (0.2) (0.25) 
Unemployment Rate 
0.044** 0.04* -0.11 0.049** 0.044** 0.047** 0.044** 
(0.022) (0.023) (0.16) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) 
Relative Minimum Wage 
0.046*** 0.05*** 0.047*** -0.019 0.046*** 0.044*** 0.047*** 
(0.01) (0.015) (0.0099) (0.13) (0.01) (0.011) (0.012) 
Human Capital Index 
0.17 0.11 0.18 0.21 0.89 0.21 0.16 
(0.31) (0.31) (0.29) (0.29) (3.34) (0.3) (0.32) 
Openness 
0.0027 0.0031 0.0041 0.0035 0.0032 0.066 0.0026 
(0.005) (0.0052) (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.005) (0.06) (0.0053) 
Economic Freedom 
-0.011 -0.011 -0.01 -0.011 -0.011 -0.014 -0.00021 
(0.0088) (0.0086) (0.009) (0.0089) (0.0088) (0.0095) (0.16) 
Log(U.S. Cocaine Price) 
0.16 0.13 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.19 0.15 
(0.15) (0.17) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
R-Squared 0.69 0.71 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.7 0.69 
a ***, **, * indicates significant effects at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
Prohibition is measured as U.S. international expenditure. Results reported lognormal estimates obtained after dropping not statistically 
significant residuals from the estimation of prohibition. P-values for the joint hypotheses that the prohibition and mth interaction effect equal 
to zero are: 0.004 (m= control-of-corruption index interaction); 0.0005 (m = unemployment rate interaction); 0.0005 (m = relative minimum 
wage interaction); 0.0015 (m = human capital index interaction); 0.0008 (m = openness interaction); and 0.0016 (m = economic freedom 
interaction). We fail to reject the Jarque-Bera test of normality at all standard significance levels for all regressions. 
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Table 12. Coca eradication estimation (lognormal estimates) a 
Independent Variable Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
Residual 
-2* -1.96* -1.92* -1.99**  -1.93* -1.83** 
(1.03) (1.13) (1.03) (1.003)  (0.99) (0.87) 
Log(Prohibition) 
2.66*** 1.93 2.04* 2.10** 5.81*** 4.51*** 11.5*** 
(0.95) (1.32) (1.06) (1.05) (1.88) (1.06) (3.36) 
Log(Prohibition) by Control-of-Corruption 
Index 
 -2.15*  
(1.25) 
Log(Prohibition) by Unemployment Rate  
0.06  
(0.047) 
Log(Prohibition) by Relative Minimum 
Wage 
 0.034  
(0.034) 
Log(Prohibition) by Human Capital Index  
-2.11***   
(0.8)  
Log(Prohibition) by Openness 
     -0.049***  
     (0.017)  
Log(Prohibition) by Economic Freedom  
 -0.14*** 
 (0.053) 
Control-of-Corruption Index 
-1.62** 13.9 -1.63*** -1.69*** -0.995** -1.06* -1.92*** 
(0.66) (9.29) (0.56) (0.54) (0.49) (0.55) (0.48) 
Unemployment Rate 
-0.21*** -0.22*** -0.64* -0.2*** -0.088** -0.18** -0.22*** 
(0.069) (0.077) (0.33) (0.075) (0.039) (0.08) (0.059) 
Relative Minimum Wage 
0.12*** 0.14*** 0.13*** -0.13 0.15*** 0.10*** 0.14*** 
(0.023) (0.02) (0.021) (0.26) (0.021) (0.02) (0.023) 
Human Capital Index 
-7.33*** -7.49*** -7.21*** -7.22*** 10.1* -6.86*** -6.94*** 
(1.35) (1.45) (1.43) (1.37) (5.64) (1.41) (1.16) 
Openness 
-0.034* -0.029 -0.029 -0.031 0.0077 0.32** -0.038** 
(0.02) (0.021) (0.02) (0.019) (0.011) (0.13) (0.016) 
Economic Freedom 
-0.044* -0.04 -0.041* -0.044* -0.015 -0.056*** 0.98** 
(0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.019) (0.018) (0.39) 
Log(U.S. Cocaine Price) 
-0.24 -0.37 -0.23 -0.23 0.33 -0.03 -0.3 
(0.37) (0.36) (0.39) (0.37) (0.25) (0.38) (0.33) 
R-Squared 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.89 0.89 
a ***, **, * indicates significant effects at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
Prohibition is measured as U.S. international expenditure. Results reported lognormal estimates obtained after dropping not statistically significant 
residuals from the estimation of prohibition.  P-values for the joint hypotheses that the prohibition and mth interaction effect equal to zero are: 
0.0001 (m = control-of-corruption index interaction); 0.008 (m = unemployment rate interaction); 0.009 (m = relative minimum wage 
interaction); <0.0001 (m = human capital index interaction); 0.0001 (m = openness interaction); and 0.0001 (m = economic freedom 
interaction). We fail to reject the Jarque-Bera test of normality at all standard significance levels for all regressions, except for the regression 
including the log(prohibition) by control-of-corruption index interaction for which we fail to reject the joint hypothesis at the 5% significance 
level.   
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Table 13. Summary of significant factors affecting illicit drug availability indicators 
(lognormal estimates) a 
Dependent Variable Log(Cocaine-
Coca Seizures) 
Log(Coca 
Cultivation) 
Log(Potential 
Cocaine Production) 
Log(Coca 
Eradication)  
No. Obs. 360 
No. Obs. 60 (cultivation, potential production, 
eradication) 
Independent Variables Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Log(Prohibition) 
  
-0.35*** 2.66***  
(0.099) (0.95) 
Ownership Variable 
    
Control-of-Corruption 
Index 
 
0.51*** 0.41* -1.62**  
(0.19) (0.22) (0.66) 
Location Variables 
    
Unemployment Rate 
  
0.044** -0.21***  
(0.022) (0.069) 
Relative Minimum Wage 
0.027*** 0.054*** 0.046*** 0.12*** 
(0.0071) (0.0099) (0.01) (0.023) 
Human Capital Index 
1.92*** -1.74*** 
 
-7.33*** 
(0.34) (0.32) 
 
(1.35) 
Openness 
   
-0.034* 
(0.02) 
   
Internalization Variables 
    
Economic Freedom 
-0.031* -0.015** 
 
-0.044* 
(0.017) (0.0071) 
 
(0.025) 
Demand Proxy     
Log(U.S. Cocaine Price) 
 0.58***    
 (0.11)   
Large Producer Proxy 
    
Big Country 
3.88*** 
   
(0.24) 
   
***, **, * indicates significant effects at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. Robust standard errors 
in parenthesis. 
a Summary of results reported excluding interaction effects (i.e. first column of Table 9, Table 10, Table 11, and Table 
12) 
 
Table 14 reports interaction-effect estimates from the significant joint hypothesis, obtained 
from each  thi  illicit drug supply indicator regression.39  The interaction variables are used to assess 
whether prohibition gives Ownership, Location or Internalization advantages to Transnational 
Criminal Enterprises, while a reduction of on-site production and an increase in transport seizures 
implies effective U.S. drug prohibition policy.40  
 
 
 
                                                          
39 Null hypothesis: the prohibition and interaction effect are jointly equal to zero. Each regression analysis includes 
one interaction effect at a time. 
40 Ownership, Location, or Internalization variables result in locational advantages to Transnational Criminal 
Enterprises if they reduce expected seizures and increase expected on-site production.   
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Table 14. Summary of interaction effects (estimates reported for significant joint 
hypothesis of prohibition and interaction effect) a 
Dependent Variable 
Log (Coca 
Cultivation)b 
Log (Potential 
Cocaine Production)c 
Log (Coca 
Eradication)d 
 Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Log(Prohibition) by Control-of-
Corruption Index 
-2.28*** -0.75 -2.15* 
(0.73) (0.74) (1.25) 
Log(Prohibition) by Unemployment 
Rate 
0.048*** 0.021 0.06 
(0.017) (0.021) (0.047) 
Log(Prohibition) by Relative 
Minimum Wage 
0.039*** 0.009 0.034 
(0.013) (0.018) (0.034) 
Log(Prohibition) by Human Capital 
Index 
-1.18*** -0.1 -2.11*** 
(0.42) (0.47) (0.8) 
Log(Prohibition) by Openness 
 -0.0087 -0.049*** 
 (0.0082) (0.017) 
Log(Prohibition) by Economic 
Freedom 
 -0.0016 -0.14*** 
 (0.022) (0.053) 
***, **, * indicates significant effects at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively.  Robust standard 
errors in parenthesis. 
a Summary of results reported for significant joint hypotheses (Ho: prohibition = mth interaction=0)  from Table 
10, Table 11, and Table 12). Joint hypothesis for the coca seizures estimation are not significant at all standard 
significance levels (see Table 9).  Joint hypothesis for the coca cultivation, potential cocaine production, and coca 
eradication regressions are significant at the 1% significance level (see Table 10, Table 11, and Table 12).   
 
  
Results in Table 14 indicate that U.S. drug prohibition policy is more effective at reducing 
coca cultivation and potential cocaine production in main cocaine-coca producer countries with 
less corruption and higher human capital.  However, the policy’s effectiveness is limited by the 
impact that higher unemployment rates and higher local minimum wages have on on-site illicit 
drug production.  Additionally, greater economic freedom and globalization strengthen the effect 
of U.S. drug prohibition policy on reducing potential cocaine production. In terms of eradication 
efforts, the lower the corruption, human capital, economic freedom, and openness the more 
effective U.S. drug prohibition policy is at increasing on-site eradications. Furthermore, higher 
unemployment rates and local minimum wages, also make U.S. drug prohibition policy more 
effective by strengthening on-site eradication efforts.  
 
Unfortunately, U.S. drug prohibition policy can potentially benefit Transnational Criminal 
Enterprises. Our results indicate that the tougher the U.S. drug prohibition policy is, the larger the 
effect of unemployment and local minimum wages have on increasing cocaine-coca on-site 
production.  In addition, tougher U.S. drug prohibition policy limits the impact that the control-of-
corruption index, human capital, economic freedom, and openness have when dealing with on-site 
eradications.  
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Table 15. Impact of prohibition on Latin American countries’ GDP growth and political 
stability a 
 Real GDP 
Growth 
Political 
Stability 
Real GDP Growth 
Political 
Stability 
 System 1 System 2 
Independent Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Log(Prohibition) – U.S. 
Interdiction Expenditure 
-0.89 -0.27**   
(0.89) (0.11)  
Log(Prohibition) – U.S. 
International Expenditure 
  -0.27 -0.023 
 (0.42) (0.056) 
Control-of-Corruption Index 
1.08 0.18** 1.04 0.15* 
(0.88) (0.091) (0.88) (0.093) 
Unemployment Rate 
-0.39*** -0.025** -0.39*** -0.024** 
(0.12) (0.0098) (0.11) (0.0098) 
Relative Minimum Wage 
-0.011 -0.017*** -0.01 -0.017*** 
(0.027) (0.0031) (0.028) (0.0033) 
Human Capital Index 
0.57 -0.053 0.54 -0.087 
(1.03) (0.13) (1.05) (0.14) 
Openness 
0.032*** 0.0049*** 0.032*** 0.0048*** 
(0.0066) (0.00077) (0.0067) (0.00081) 
Log(Distance) 
-0.12 0.49*** -0.1 0.51*** 
(0.71) (0.073) (0.71) (0.076) 
Economic Freedom 
-0.075** -0.011*** -0.073** -0.011*** 
(0.032) (0.0035) (0.032) (0.0035) 
Tariff Rate 
-0.15* -0.00074 -0.13 0.0095 
(0.088) (0.01) (0.087) (0.01) 
Internet Access 
0.028 0.0072** 0.026 0.007** 
(0.026) (0.0032) (0.026) (0.0032) 
Log(U.S. Cocaine Price) 
-4.81*** -0.087 -4.7*** -0.066 
(0.87) (0.1) (0.86) (0.11) 
Big Country 
1.44*** -0.73*** 1.43*** -0.73*** 
(0.44) (0.059) (0.45) (0.06) 
R-Squared 0.84 0.83 
***, **, * indicates significant effects at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. Robust standard 
errors in parenthesis.  
a System 1 and System 2 indicate the simultaneous regression of real GDP growth and political stability on 
prohibition, Ownership, Location, and Internalization characteristics. System 1 measures prohibition as U.S 
interdiction expenditure. System 2 measures prohibition as U.S. international expenditure. Both System 1 and 
System 2 account for the correlation between real GDP growth and political stability. Results reported lognormal 
estimates obtained after dropping not statistically significant residuals from the estimation of prohibition.  Mean 
of the unemployment rate, tariff rate, and internet access are included as regressors (estimates not reported).   
 
Table 15 reports the economic and political impact of U.S. drug prohibition policy on real GDP 
growth and political stability in Latin America.41 Prohibition spending does not impact Latin 
American countries’ economic growth, but it does create political instability for the region.  When 
prohibition cuts off entrepreneurs from an importance source of income the intuitive belief is that 
individuals are incentivized to move legal transactions into the shadow economy.  Unfortunately, 
that means they cannot use the legal court and judicial system, and violence is used as a form of 
                                                          
41 Estimates reported in Table 15 were obtained from simultaneously estimating Real GDP growth and political 
stability, considering the correlation between the two dependent variables. 
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enforcement. The inability to use the legal court and judicial system means that brides are used as 
an incentive for cooperation of government officials, and threat of violence is used to induce 
cooperation, eroding the role of the government as enforcer of law and order (Nadelmann, 1988). 
In the Americas, most countries have a direct relationship between the cocaine market and violence 
(United National Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 2008, 2010a).  In Colombia, 
approximately 40 percent of the homicides have resulted from drug production activities 
(Organization of American States (OAS), 2013b) and in Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, and 
Mexico murder rates are consistently higher in areas related to cocaine drug trafficking (United 
National Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 2008, 2010b).  Unfortunately, successful 
prohibition policies in one country have been found to increase violence and drug trafficking in 
other countries (Mejia and Restrepo, 2014).  
 
 
7.1 Robustness Checks 
 
A sensitivity analysis is provided as support of the superiority of the MLMV and Multiple 
Imputation analysis as econometric techniques when estimating the impact of U.S. drug 
prohibition policy on illicit supply indicators, real GDP growth, and political stability in 
comparison to a complete case analysis.  Under the assumption that data is MAR, complete case 
analysis leads to biased estimators and large standard errors (Newman, 2014).  Newman (2014) 
points that using Maximum Likelihood and Multiple Imputation techniques to deal with missing 
values when data is MAR, produces unbiased estimators and accurate standard errors.  
 
Table 16 provides the estimation of illicit drug supply indicators, real GDP growth, and 
political stability using complete cased analysis.  As shown in Table 16, the standard errors of the 
parameters estimators are larger than those produced by the MLMV and Multiple Imputation.42 
The MLMV and Multiple Imputation analysis produce more efficient estimators when data is 
MAR.   In addition, the imputed data sets, in the Multiple Imputation analysis, showed the mean 
and standard deviation for the variables with missing observations to be approximately the same 
as their mean and standard deviation in the original data set.43  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
42 As presented in Table 9 through Table 15 
43 Tables can be provided upon request. These tables were omitted for brevity.  
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Table 16. Estimation using complete case analysis  
 Log(Seizures) 
Log(Coca 
Cultivation) 
Log(Potential 
Cocaine 
Production) 
Log(Coca 
Eradication) 
  Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
Residual --- --- --- 
-1.61 
(1.11) 
Log(Prohibition) – U.S. 
Interdiction Expenditure 
1.3* 
--- --- --- 
(0.68) 
Log(Prohibition) - U.S. 
International Expenditure 
--- 
-0.11 -0.23** 2.23** 
(0.14) (0.11) (1.05) 
Control-of-Corruption Index 
-0.24 0.55*** 0.48** -1.5** 
(0.27) (0.21) (0.19) (0.62) 
Unemployment Rate 
-0.019 -0.006 0.034 -0.17** 
(0.054) (0.021) (0.03) (0.084) 
Relative Minimum Wage 
0.025*** 0.052*** 0.042*** 0.13*** 
(0.0082) (0.011) (0.011) (0.025) 
Human Capital Index 
1.92*** -1.7*** 0.24 -6.56*** 
(0.37) (0.37) (0.32) (1.45) 
Openness 
-0.0034 -0.0049 -0.0029 -0.025 
(0.0034) (0.0052) (0.0056) (0.022) 
Economic Freedom 
-0.025 -0.015* -0.016* -0.044* 
(0.02) (0.0078) (0.0095) (0.025) 
Tariff Rate 
0.017 
--- --- --- 
(0.061) 
Internet Access 
-0.0035 
--- --- --- 
(0.013) 
Log(U.S. Cocaine Price) 
-0.0088 0.58*** 0.14 -0.13 
(0.46) (0.12) (0.15) (0.38) 
Big Country 
4.001*** 
--- --- --- 
(0.25) 
Observations 268 50 50 50 
***, **, * indicates significant effects at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. Robust 
standard errors in parenthesis.  
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Table 16. Estimation using complete case analysis (continued) 
 Real GDP 
Growth 
Political 
Stability 
Real GDP 
Growth 
Political 
Stability 
 System 1 System 2 
Independent Variable Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
Log(Prohibition) – U.S. 
Interdiction Expenditure 
0.12 -0.44*** 
--- --- 
(1.26) (0.14) 
Log(Prohibition) – U.S. 
International Expenditure 
--- --- 
0.37 -0.034 
(0.62) (0.073) 
Control-of-Corruption 
Index 
1.01 0.24** 0.93 0.18* 
(0.95) (0.1) (0.93) (0.11) 
Unemployment Rate 
-0.36** -0.02* -0.36** -0.02* 
(0.16) (0.012) (0.16) (0.012) 
Relative Minimum Wage 
-0.0082 -0.016*** -0.011 -0.017*** 
(0.03) (0.0033) (0.031) (0.0038) 
Human Capital Index 
-0.33 -0.009 -0.43 -0.06 
(1.07) (0.14) (1.1) (0.15) 
Openness 
0.04*** 0.0042*** 0.04*** 0.004*** 
(0.007) (0.00076) (0.0071) (0.00082) 
Log(Distance) 
0.28 0.46*** 0.34 0.5*** 
(0.84) (0.078) (0.84) (0.083) 
Economic Freedom 
-0.07* -0.012*** -0.07* -0.0098*** 
(0.036) (0.0035) (0.036) (0.0036) 
Tariff Rate 
-0.13 -0.0045 -0.11 0.01 
(0.1) (0.01) (0.099) (0.0099) 
Internet Access 
0.031 0.0081** 0.034 0.0067* 
(0.032) (0.0039) (0.032) (0.0039) 
Log(U.S. Cocaine Price) 
-4.71*** -0.094 -4.86*** -0.047 
(1.02) (0.12) (1.0001) (0.12) 
Big Country 
1.72*** -0.74*** 1.73*** -0.73*** 
(0.48) (0.063) (0.49) (0.065) 
No. Obs. 252 252 
***, **, * indicates significant effects at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis 
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8. Conclusions 
 
U.S. drug prohibition policy in the Americas is examined in conjunction with the factors 
driving Transnational Criminal Enterprises locational decisions in the cocaine-coca market using 
Dunning’s Eclectic Paradigm for international business. Drug prohibition programs yield 
ambiguous results for both local governments and Transnational Criminal Enterprises. 
Understanding the site/situational specific characteristics can lead to more efficient prohibition 
programs by successfully limiting cocaine supply as well as restricting profitable business 
opportunities for Transnational Criminal Enterprises.  
 
Our results indicate that tougher U.S. drug prohibition policy significantly decreases cocaine-
coca at the source by decreasing potential cocaine production and increasing coca eradication. 
However, successful on-site efforts to decrease cocaine-coca supply can also be hindered by 
tougher U.S. drug prohibition policy. Tougher U.S. drug prohibition policy generates advantages 
for Transnational Criminal Enterprises, by amplifying the impact of the Location variables 
(unemployment and local wages) on cocaine-coca production increases. More aggressive U.S. 
drug prohibition policy also generates advantages to Transnational Criminal Enterprises by 
limiting the impact of Ownership (control-of-corruption index) and Internalization (economic 
freedom) variables at increasing eradication efforts. 
 
Successful drug prohibition policies must be also designed in conjunction with the Ownership, 
Location and Internalization variables, and be directed towards outcomes that prove to be 
disadvantageous to Transnational Criminal Enterprises. Specifically, our results indicate that it is 
disadvantageous for Transnational Criminal Enterprises when local unemployment rate decreases, 
human capital increases, and there is greater economic freedom as these Location and 
Internalization variables reduce cocaine-coca production. Furthermore, drug prohibition policies 
should go in hand with policies aimed at demand reduction, thus lowering U.S. retail price of 
cocaine and reducing coca cultivation. 
 
Since unlimited prohibition spending does not exist, the model’s results signal a site-specific 
approach to prohibition policy. For example, U.S. drug prohibition policy should focus on reducing 
cocaine-coca on-site production while at the same time allocating resources designed to 
disincentivize farmers’ participation in illicit economies. Our results indicate that developing rural 
farming communities through reducing unemployment and improving economic freedom, is 
expected to reduce cocaine-coca production on-site. Greater economic freedom results from 
improving the formalization of land and greater business, labor, and monetary freedom. In 
addition, U.S. drug prohibition policy should be combined with risk minimization policies for 
farmers. Stability and access to market resources are important determinants of  the farmer’s 
decision to participate in an illicit economy (Felbab-Brown, 2014).  As evidenced by the success 
of Thailand in 2012, a well-managed and well-funded comprehensive rural development program 
accompanied with the generation of employment opportunities reduced poppy cultivation (Felbab-
Brown, 2014). 
 
U.S. drug prohibition policy is also shown to have negative externalities, by increasing the 
political instability for Latin America. The benefit to consumer countries through the diminished 
accessibility of the illicit drugs is derived from the transfer of prohibition costs to producer and 
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transit countries (Collins, 2014).  The negative impact that U.S. drug prohibition policy has had 
on the political stability for Latin America, means alternative approaches need to be considered.  
 
One potential approach would be to legalize cocaine while designing programs that deal with 
drug consumption strictly from the consumer perspective. These programs need to provide 
information on all the effects of drug use. Niskanen (1992) indicates that consumption reduction 
is possible under legalization by making information of the effects of drug use broadly available. 
Niskanen (1992) reported that beginning in 1885 cocaine was sold in a variety of products.  In 
1906, the Pure Food and Drug Act began requiring the identification of specific drugs on the label 
of patent medicines. This approach successfully decreased the  use of cocaine before its use was 
prohibited (Niskanen, 1992).  Another alternative approach to prohibition policy would be to treat 
drug use as a public-health problem, instead of focusing on enforcement. During the Nixon 
Administration, the only time in the U.S. history of its war on drugs, most of the funding for drug 
policy went towards treatment, rather than law enforcement. The program quickly reverted  
funding back to prohibition before any significant results were uncovered (WGBH Educational 
Foundation, 2014).  Niskanen (1992) points out that the Netherlands provides drug users with 
treatment and counseling, and users are not prosecuted for possession of small amounts of illicit 
drugs, while criminal prosecution is directed to major suppliers. The results of this program have 
been smaller usage rates of illicit drugs among teenagers compared to the U.S. and lower violent 
crime rates. Despite discussing the likely effects of cocaine legalization from indirect inference, 
Niskanen (1992) concludes that illicit drug legalization will significantly reduce the price and 
increase demand.  There is no one-size-fits-all approach that policy makers can use that always 
results in reducing cocaine supply. U.S. drug prohibition policy becomes a balancing act between 
Ownership, Location and Internalization variables, eradication efforts, and pursuing programs that 
reduce either current or potential cocaine production.  
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